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Author:Verner, Emil 

Briefing
Bank Failures: Solvency and Liquidity

Bank failures are almost always preceded by weak fundamentals: bad loans, low capital and/or declining earnings. Meanwhile, depositor panics, while dramatic, are rarely the root cause.Low recovery rates on failed banks' assets and examiners' postmortem assessments both point to deep insolvency, even in banks that experienced runs before failing.Deposit insurance and emergency lending alone cannot prevent crises. Policies that ensure adequate bank capital and sound risk management are essential.
Richmond Fed Economic Brief , Volume 26 , Issue 12

Discussion Paper
Why Do Banks Fail? The Predictability of Bank Failures

Can bank failures be predicted before they happen? In a previous post, we established three facts about failing banks that indicated that failing banks experience deteriorating fundamentals many years ahead of their failure and across a broad range of institutional settings. In this post, we document that bank failures are remarkably predictable based on simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements that measure a bank’s insolvency risk and funding vulnerabilities.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20241122

Discussion Paper
Using AI to Let History Speak About Bank Runs

Banking crises are commonly associated with bank runs and banking panics, yet our empirical understanding of bank runs is constrained by a lack of bank-level data. In a new paper, we use large language models (LLMs) to extract information on bank runs from millions of digitized historical newspaper pages, creating the most comprehensive database of bank runs in U.S. history. Every bank run episode that we identify is documented on a companion website where users can browse and examine individual episodes, and read the original newspaper articles. In this post, we describe how we built this ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20260707a

Working Paper
Financial Liberalizations, Booms, and Crashes

Financial liberalization is often seen as a way to deepen credit markets and stimulate economic growth, but it may also fuel credit booms that end in crisis. We construct a new cross-country database of banking regulation policies covering 21 regulatory indicators for 18 advanced economies since World War II. We distinguish liberalizations that directly relax constraints on credit supply from broader financial reforms. Liberalizations that directly affect credit supply lead to substantial expansions in private credit. Credit expansion is concentrated in non-tradable sectors and is not ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2026-034

Discussion Paper
Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity

Do banks fail because of runs or because they become insolvent? Answering this question is central to understanding financial crises and designing effective financial stability policies. Long-run historical evidence reveals that the root cause of bank failures is usually insolvency. The importance of bank runs is somewhat overstated. Runs matter, but in most cases they trigger or accelerate failure at already weak banks, rather than cause otherwise sound banks to fail.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20260416

Working Paper
Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity

Bank failures can stem from runs on otherwise solvent banks or from losses that render banks insolvent, regardless of withdrawals. Disentangling the relative importance of liquidity and solvency in explaining bank failures is central to understanding financial crises and designing effective financial stability policies. This paper reviews evidence on the causes of bank failures. Bank failures — both with and without runs — are almost always related to poor fundamentals. Low recovery rates in failure suggest that most failed banks that experienced runs were likely fundamentally insolvent. ...
Working Paper , Paper 26-02

Discussion Paper
Inflating Away the Debt: The Debt-Inflation Channel of German Hyperinflation

The recent rise in price pressures around the world has reignited interest in understanding how inflation transmits to the real economy. Economists have long recognized that unexpected surges of inflation can redistribute wealth from creditors to debtors when debt contracts are written in nominal terms (see, for example, Fisher 1933). If debtors are financially constrained, this redistribution can affect real economic activity by relaxing financing constraints. This mechanism, which we call the debt-inflation channel, is well understood theoretically (for example, Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20230713

Report
Failing Banks

Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1863 through 2024 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive noncore funding. These commonalities imply that bank failures are highly predictable using simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements. Failures with runs were common before deposit insurance, but these failures are strongly related to weak fundamentals, casting doubt on the importance of ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1117

Working Paper
Supervising Failing Banks

This paper studies the role of banking supervision in anticipating, monitoring, and disciplining failing banks. We document that supervisors anticipate most bank failures with a high degree of accuracy. Supervisors play an important role in requiring troubled banks to recognize losses, taking enforcement actions, and ultimately closing failing banks. To establish causality, we exploit exogenous variation in supervisory strictness during the Global Financial Crisis. Stricter supervision leads to more loss recognition, reduced dividend payouts, and an increase in the likelihood and speed of ...
Working Paper , Paper 25-10

Report
Bank Runs With and Without Bank Failure

We study the causes and consequences of bank runs. By applying large language models to historical newspapers, we create a comprehensive database of bank runs in U.S. history with information on 3,984 runs on individual banks from 1863 to 1934. Our novel data allow us to establish that runs are considerably more likely in weak banks but also occur in strong banks, especially in response to negative news about the real economy or the broader banking system. However, runs typically only result in failure for banks with poor fundamentals. Strong banks survive runs through various mechanisms, ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1198

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