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Author:Lacker, Jeffrey M. 

Working Paper
Money Market Fund Reform: Dealing with the Fundamental Problem

After the events in March 2020, it became clear to policymakers that the 2014 reform of the money market funds (MMFs) industry had not successfully addressed all associated stability concerns related to surges in withdrawals. In December 2021, the SEC proposed a new set of rules governing how money market funds can operate. A fundamental problem behind the instability of (some) money market funds is the expectation that backstop liquidity support will be provided by the government in the event of financial distress, along with the government's inability to credibly commit to not provide such ...
Working Paper , Paper 22-08

Journal Article
The check float puzzle

Economic Quarterly , Issue Sum , Pages 1-26

Journal Article
President's message : The importance of financial education

Econ Focus , Volume 13 , Issue Fall , Pages 1

Journal Article
Noteworthy : The promise and peril of government intervention

Econ Focus , Volume 9 , Issue Fall , Pages 1

Journal Article
Should the Fed Have a Financial Stability Mandate? Lessons from the Fed's First 100 Years

President Jeffrey Lacker and Research Publications Content Manager Renee Haltom explore the Fed's role in financial stability. Following the global financial crisis of 2007--08, the Fed has been given enhanced regulatory responsibilities to prevent future crises. However, most of the Fed's actions in pursuit of financial stability have historically come through emergency lending once crises are underway. The authors conclude that arguments in favor of emergency lending are based on erroneous readings of history. Instead, emergency lending may undermine financial stability, as well as the ...
Economic Quarterly , Issue 1Q , Pages 49-75

Working Paper
Collateralized debt as the optimal contract

In a simple risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under which a collateralized debt contract is the optimal allocation. The critical condition for optimality is that the borrower values the collateral good more highly than does the lender; otherwise the optimal contract does not resemble debt. Limited collateral can give rise to an endogenous borrowing constraint, driving a further wedge between the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the borrower and the lender. I argue that perhaps all debt contracts are implicitly collateralized.
Working Paper , Paper 98-04

Journal Article
President's message : What should policymakers do about executive pay?

Econ Focus , Volume 15 , Issue 4Q , Pages 1

Journal Article
President's message: Economic growth: two possible paths

Econ Focus , Volume 15 , Issue 2Q , Pages 1

Journal Article
Joining Community Development and Research

Econ Focus , Issue 1Q , Pages 1-1

Journal Article
President’s message: Big banks needs “living wills”

Econ Focus , Volume 17 , Issue 1Q , Pages 1

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