Search Results

SORT BY: PREVIOUS / NEXT
Author:Canzoneri, Matthew B. 

Conference Paper
A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance

Proceedings

Conference Paper
Noncooperative monetary policies in interdependent economies: time consistency and reputation

Proceedings

Working Paper
Wage contracting, exchange rate volatility, and exchange intervention policy

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 212

Working Paper
The effects of exchange rate variability on output and employment

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 240

Working Paper
Wealth effects in the new neoclassical models

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 158

Working Paper
Monetary policy games and the role of private information

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 249

Conference Paper
Price- and wage- inflation targeting: variations on a theme by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin

Proceedings

Working Paper
Rational destabilizing speculation and exchange intervention policy

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 157

Working Paper
A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance

In this paper, we discuss a new interpretation of what might be meant by the "coordination" of policies; in this interpretation, the policymakers are selecting a noncooperative solution rather than a cooperative solution. The new interpretation is suggested by the fact that games typically have a large number of Nash solutions, and players are not indifferent as to which occurs. The multiplicity of solutions may be due to information sharing and surveillance, the choice of policy instruments, or the adoption of reputational strategies in repeated versions of the game. The "coordination" ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 340

Working Paper
A Static Capital Buffer is Hard To Beat

In a model with endogenous risk-taking, deposit insurance and limited liability may lead banks to make risky loans that are socially inefficient. Capital requirements can prevent excessive risk-taking at the cost of reducing liquidity-producing bank deposits. A policy that sets capital requirements just high enough to prevent excessive risktaking will move capital requirements pro-, counter-, or a-cyclically depending on the shock source. However, such a policy requires full knowledge of all the shocks hitting the economy and is not implementable. Simple rules that respond to cyclical ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2026-042

PREVIOUS / NEXT