Working Paper
A Static Capital Buffer is Hard To Beat
Abstract: In a model with endogenous risk-taking, deposit insurance and limited liability may lead banks to make risky loans that are socially inefficient. Capital requirements can prevent excessive risk-taking at the cost of reducing liquidity-producing bank deposits. A policy that sets capital requirements just high enough to prevent excessive risktaking will move capital requirements pro-, counter-, or a-cyclically depending on the shock source. However, such a policy requires full knowledge of all the shocks hitting the economy and is not implementable. Simple rules that respond to cyclical conditions—in line with Basel III guidance—perform poorly, whereas a small static capital buffer can do much better.
JEL Classification: C54; E13; G21;
https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2026.042
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https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2026042pap.pdf
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
Part of Series: Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Publication Date: 2026-06-22
Number: 2026-042