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Report
Is size everything?
We examine sources of systemic risk (threshold size, complexity, and interconnectedness) with factors constructed from equity returns of large financial firms, after accounting for standard risk factors. From the factor loadings and factor returns, we estimate the implicit government subsidy for each systemic risk measure, and find that, from 1963 to 2006, only our big-versus-huge threshold size factor, TSIZE, implies a positive implicit subsidy on average. Further, pre-2007 TSIZE-implied subsidies predict the Federal Reserve?s liquidity facility loans and the Treasury?s TARP loans during the ...
Working Paper
Did bank borrowers benefit from the TARP program : the effects of TARP on loan contract terms
We study the effects of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on loan contract terms to businesses borrowing from recipient banks. Using a difference-in-difference analysis, we find that TARP led to more favorable terms to these borrowers in all five contract terms studied ? loan amounts, spreads, maturities, collateral, and covenants. This suggests recipient banks' borrowers benefited from TARP. These findings are statistically and economically significant, and are robust to dealing with potential endogeneity issues and other checks. {{p}} The contract term improvements are concentrated ...
Working Paper
Did saving Wall Street really save Main Street : the real effects of TARP on local economic conditions
We investigate whether saving Wall Street through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) really saved Main Street during the recent financial crisis. Our difference-in-difference analysis suggests that TARP statistically and economically significantly increased net job creation and net hiring establishments and decreased business and personal bankruptcies. The results are robust, including accounting for endogeneity. The main mechanisms driving the results appear to be increases in commercial real estate lending and off-balance sheet real estate guarantees. These results suggest that ...
Working Paper
Do Costly Internal Equity Injections Reveal Bank Expectations about Post-Crisis Real Outcomes?
We construct a novel signal of bank expectations utilizing confidential data and a regulatory constraint imposed on bank internal capital markets during the 2008 crisis that made internal equity injections to commercial bank subsidiaries difficult to reverse. When the US government initiated a $176 billion recapitalization program during the crisis, this constraint made it costly ex-ante for multi-bank holding companies (MBHC) to use these funds for the purpose of recapitalizing subsidiaries against future anticipated losses; in contrast, lending the funds to subsidiaries was exempt from the ...
Discussion Paper
On Fire-Sale Externalities, TARP Was Close to Optimal
Imagine that many large and levered banks suffer heavy losses and must quickly sell assets to reduce their leverage. We expect the market price of the assets sold to decline, at least temporarily. As a result, any other financial institutions that happen to hold the same assets will experience balance sheet losses through no fault of their own —a negative fire-sale externality. In this post, we show that the vulnerability to fire-sale externalities was high during the crisis and that the capital injections of the government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) helped reduce it ...
Working Paper
A Tale of Two Bailouts: Effects of TARP and PPP on Subprime Consumer Debt
High levels of subprime consumer debt can create social problems. We test the effects of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) bailouts during the Global Financial Crisis and COVID-19 crisis, respectively, on this debt. We use over 11 million credit bureau observations of individual consumer debt combined with banking, bailout, and local market data. We find that subprime consumers with more TARP institutions in their markets had significantly increased debt burdens following these bailouts. In contrast, PPP bailouts were associated with reduced ...