Journal Article
The cost of Kelo
Rolnick, Arthur J.; Davies, Phil (2006-06)
Contrary to last year's U.S. Supreme Court ruling Kelo v. City of New London, using eminent domain to foster economic development diminishes rather than enhances economic growth and the public good.
The Region , Volume 20 , Issue Jun , Pages 12-16, 42-45

Journal Article
Sharing vs. eminent domain
Hong, Yu-Hung (2008-01)
Controversy over the public taking of land through eminent domain intensified after the Supreme Court backed a 2000 New London taking. In contrast, an approach practiced abroad can help all stakeholders share in the benefits of economic development projects.
Communities and Banking , Issue Win , Pages 3-5

Journal Article
Condemned prosperity
Davies, Phil (2006-03)
The use of eminent domain for private development may benefit district communities, but it blights the overall economy.
Fedgazette , Volume 18 , Issue Mar , Pages 14-17

Journal Article
The taking of prosperity? Kelo vs. New London and the economics of eminent domain
Rothstein, Paul; Garrett, Thomas A. (2007-01)
The forced sale of homes for private development usually results in a zero-sum gain and may actually hinder development in the area, economists have found.
The Regional Economist , Issue Jan , Pages 4-9

Working Paper
Private takings
Nosal, Ed (2007)
This paper considers the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court ruling that can be interpreted as supporting the use of eminent domain in transferring the property rights of one private agent?a landowner?to another private agent?a developer. Compared to voluntary exchange, when property rights are transferred via eminent domain, landowners? investments in their properties become more inefficient and, as a result, any benefit associated with mitigating the holdout problem between landowners and the developer is reduced. Social welfare can only increase if the holdout problem is ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 0713

Working Paper
Loggers vs. campers: compensation for the taking of property rights
Giammarino, Ronald; Nosal, Ed (2004)
Governments often have the power to take property rights from private citizens but their responsibility to pay compensation is typically not well specified. In this paper we examine how the compensation rule adopted by a country affects both private investment decisions and takings decisions. We build on a widely accepted argument that any lump sum compensation, including zero, is the socially optimal compensation scheme. The lump sum compensation result hinges critically on the assumptions that the government maximizes social welfare and that the level of private investment does not affect ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 0406