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Working Paper
The costs and benefits of liquidity regulations: Lessons from an idle monetary policy tool
We investigate how liquidity regulations affect banks by examining a dormant monetary policy tool that functions as a liquidity regulation. Our identification strategy uses a regression kink design that relies on the variation in a marginal high-quality liquid asset (HQLA) requirement around an exogenous threshold. We show that mandated increases in HQLA cause banks to reduce credit supply. Liquidity requirements also depress banks' profitability, though some of the regulatory costs are passed on to liability holders. We document a prudential benefit of liquidity requirements by showing that ...
Working Paper
Private Equity and Debt Contract Enforcement: Evidence from Covenant Violations
We document the importance of a financial sponsor when a borrower violates a covenant, providing creditors the opportunity to enforce debt contracts. We identify private-equity (PE) sponsored borrowers in the Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data and find PE-sponsored borrowers violate covenants more often than comparable non-PE borrowers. Yet, compared to non-PE, PE-backed borrowers experience smaller reductions in credit commitment upon violation, suggesting lenders are lenient with PE sponsors. Moreover, this leniency is stronger among financially healthier lenders. We show that our ...
Working Paper
Employment Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy : Evidence from QE
This paper investigates the effect of the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policy on employment via a bank lending channel. We find that banks with higher mortgage-backed securities holdings issued relatively more loans after the first and third rounds of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3). While additional volume is concentrated in refinanced mortgages after QE1, increases are driven by newly originated home purchase mortgages and additional commercial and industrial lending after QE3. Using spatial variation, we show that regions with a high share of affected banks experienced ...
Working Paper
Private Equity and Debt Contract Enforcement: Evidence from Covenant Violations
We document the importance of a financial sponsor when a borrower violates a covenant, providing creditors the opportunity to enforce debt contracts. We identify private-equity (PE) sponsored borrowers in the Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data and find PE-sponsored borrowers violate covenants more often than comparable non-PE borrowers. Yet, compared to non-PE, PE-backed borrowers experience smaller reductions in credit commitment upon violation, suggesting lenders are lenient with PE sponsors. Moreover, this leniency is stronger among financially healthier lenders. We show that our ...
Working Paper
“Don’t Know What You Got Till It’s Gone”—The Community Reinvestment Act in a Changing Financial Landscape
This study provides new evidence on the impact of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) on mortgage lending by taking advantage of an exogenous policy shock in 2014, which caused significant changes in neighborhoods’ CRA eligibility in the Philadelphia market. The loss of CRA coverage leads to an over 10 percent decrease in purchase originations by CRA-regulated lenders. While nondepository institutions replace approximately half, but not all, of the decreased lending, their increased market share was accompanied by a greater involvement in riskier and more costly FHA lending. This study ...
Working Paper
Private Equity and Debt Contract Enforcement: Evidence from Covenant Violations
We document the importance of a financial sponsor when a borrower violates a covenant, providing creditors the opportunity to enforce debt contracts. We identify private-equity (PE) sponsored borrowers in the Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data and find PE-sponsored borrowers violate covenants more often than comparable non-PE borrowers. Yet, compared to non-PE, PE-backed borrowers experience smaller reductions in credit commitment upon violation, suggesting lenders are lenient with PE sponsors. Moreover, this leniency is stronger among financially healthier lenders. We show that our ...
Working Paper
Private Equity and Debt Contract Enforcement: Evidence from Covenant Violations
We document the importance of a financial sponsor when a borrower violates a covenant, providing creditors the opportunity to enforce debt contracts. We identify private-equity (PE) sponsored borrowers in the Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data and find PE-sponsored borrowers violate covenants more often than comparable non-PE borrowers. Yet, compared to non-PE, PE-backed borrowers experience smaller reductions in credit commitment upon violation, suggesting lenders are lenient with PE sponsors. Moreover, this leniency is stronger among financially healthier lenders. We show that our ...
Working Paper
Private Equity and Debt Contract Enforcement: Evidence from Covenant Violations
We document the importance of a financial sponsor when a borrower violates a covenant, providing creditors the opportunity to enforce debt contracts. We identify private-equity (PE) sponsored borrowers in the Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data and find PE-sponsored borrowers violate covenants more often than comparable non-PE borrowers. Yet, compared to non-PE, PE-backed borrowers experience smaller reductions in credit commitment upon violation, suggesting lenders are lenient with PE sponsors. Moreover, this leniency is stronger among financially healthier lenders. We show that our ...
Working Paper
The Long-Run Real Effects of Banking Crises: Firm-Level Investment Dynamics and the Role of Wage Rigidity
I study the long-run effects of credit market disruptions on real firm outcomes and how these effects depend on nominal wage rigidity at the firm level. Exploiting variation in firms' refinancing needs during the global financial crisis, I trace out firms' investment and growth trajectories in response to a credit supply shock. Financially shocked firms exhibit a temporary investment gap for two years, resulting in a persistent accumulated growth gap six years after the crisis. Shocked firms with rigid wages exhibit a significantly steeper drop in investment and an additional long-run growth ...
Working Paper
The Long-Run Real Effects of Banking Crises: Firm-Level Investment Dynamics and the Role of Wage Rigidity
I study the long-run effects of credit market disruptions on real firm outcomes and how these effects depend on nominal wage rigidity at the firm level. Exploiting variation in firms' refinancing needs during the global financial crisis, I trace out firms' investment and growth trajectories in response to a credit supply shock. Financially shocked firms exhibit a temporary investment gap for two years, resulting in a persistent accumulated growth gap six years after the crisis. Shocked firms with rigid wages exhibit a significantly steeper drop in investment and an additional long-run growth ...