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Author:Sibert, Anne C. 

Working Paper
The risk premium in the market for forward foreign exchange

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 211

Working Paper
The risk premium in the foreign exchange market

Research Working Paper , Paper 87-07

Working Paper
Capital accumulation and foreign investment taxation

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 218

Working Paper
Exchange rates, market structure, prices and import values

Research Working Paper , Paper 87-09

Working Paper
Government finance in a model of currency substitution

Research Working Paper , Paper 93-09

Working Paper
An analysis of the welfare implications of alternative exchange rate regimes: an intertemporal model with an application

We construct a two-period model of an open economy and use the model to analyze the welfare implications of fixed and floating exchange regimes. Consumers have perfect foresight and save by holding domestic and foreign bonds, which are chosen according to relative interest rates, deflated by the rate of devaluation of the domestic currency. The government produces a pure public good and finances its deficits by issuing money, domestic bonds, and by foreign borrowing. The government's bonds compete with private investment, which is entirely debt financed. Foreign exchange, i.e., foreign bonds, ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 273

Working Paper
The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information

International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 248

Working Paper
An equilibrium model of spot and forward exchange rates

Research Working Paper , Paper 90-02

Working Paper
Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles Anne Sibert

There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycle in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycle is driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private information is either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 271

Working Paper
Taxing capital in an open economy

Research Working Paper , Paper 88-11

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