Working Paper
Post-resolution treatment of depositors at failed banks: implications for the severity of banking crises, systemic risk, and too-big-to-fail
Seelig, Steven A.; Kaufman, George G. (2000)
Bank failures are widely viewed in all countries as more damaging to the economy than the failure of other firms of similar size for a number of reasons. The failures may produce losses to depositors and other creditors, break long-standing bank-customers loan relationships, disrupt the payments system, and spillover in domino fashion to other banks, financial institutions and markets, and even to the macroeconomy (Kaufman, 1996). Thus, bank failures are viewed as potentially more likely to involve contagion or systemic risk than the collapse of other firms. The risk of such actual or ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-00-16

Journal Article
Post-resolution treatment of depositors at failed banks: implications for the severity of banking crises, systemic risk, and too big to fail
Seelig, Steven A.; Kaufman, George G. (2002-04)
Losses from bank failures have significant adverse implications for bank stakeholders, as well as for the macroeconomy. This article examines the potential sources of such losses, in particular the losses that may occur after the date a bank is failed, and makes recommendations on how to minimize these losses.
Economic Perspectives , Volume 26 , Issue Q II