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Author:Saunders, Anthony 

Conference Paper
Bank underwriting of debt securities: modern evidence

Proceedings , Paper 481

Working Paper
Incentives to engage in bank window-dressing: manager vs. stockholder conflicts

Working Papers , Paper 89-9

Report
The Myth of the Lead Arranger’s Share

We challenge theories that lead arrangers retain shares of syndicated loans to overcome information asymmetries. Lead arrangers frequently sell their entire loan stake—in over 50 percent of term and 70 percent of institutional loans. These selloffs usually occur days after origination, with lead arrangers retaining no other borrower exposure in 37 percent of selloff cases. Counter to theories, sold loans perform better than retained loans. Our results imply that information asymmetries could be lower than commonly assumed or mitigated by alternative mechanisms such as underwriting risk. We ...
Staff Reports , Paper 922

Journal Article
Securities activities of commercial banks: the problem of conflicts of interest

Business Review , Issue Jul/Aug , Pages 17-27

Working Paper
Additions to bank loan-loss reserves: good news or bad news?

Working Papers , Paper 89-7

Report
The role of bank advisors in mergers and acquisitions

This paper looks at the role of both commercial and investment banks in providing merger advisory services. In this area, unlike some areas of investment banking, commercial banks have always been allowed to compete directly with investment banks. In their dual role as lenders and advisors to firms that are the target or the acquirer in a merger, banks can be viewed as serving a certification function. However, banks acting as both lenders and advisors face a potential conflict of interest that may mitigate or offset any certification effect. Overall, we find evidence supporting the ...
Staff Reports , Paper 143

Working Paper
Bank equity stakes in borrowing firms and financial distress

The authors derive optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude with a healthy firm's owners to seek unnecessary concessions or to collude with a distressed firm's owners to claim that the firm is healthy. To prove that a request for concessions has not come from a healthy firm/bank coalition, the bank must hold either a very small or a very large equity stake when ...
Working Papers , Paper 96-1

Conference Paper
Alternative models for clearance and settlement: the case of the single European capital market

Proceedings

Conference Paper
Intra- and interindustry effects of bank securities market activities: the case of discount brokerage

Proceedings , Paper 95

Report
Specialization in Banking

Using highly detailed data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks "specialize" by concentrating their lending disproportionately into one industry. This specialization improves a bank’s industry-specific knowledge and allows it to offer generous loan terms to borrowers, especially to firms with access to alternate sources of funding and during periods of greater nonbank lending. Superior industry-specific knowledge is further reflected in better loan and, ultimately, bank performance. Banks concentrate more on their primary industry in times of instability ...
Staff Reports , Paper 967

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