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Author:Nieto, Maria J. 

Working Paper
Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors' prompt corrective action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the European Union?

Over the past years, several countries around the world have adopted a system of prudential prompt corrective action (PCA). The European Union countries are being encouraged to adopt PCA by policy analysts who explicitly call for its adoption. To date, most of the discussion on PCA has focused on its overall merits. This paper focuses on the preconditions needed for the adoption of an effective PCA. These preconditions include conceptual elements such as a prudential supervisory focus on minimizing deposit insurance losses and mandating supervisory action as capital declines. These ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2006-27

Working Paper
Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the European Union: Is prompt corrective action partly the solution?

This paper discusses the institutional changes needed in Europe if prompt corrective action (PCA) is to be effective in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups? financial condition to prudential supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by prudential supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank in a cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2007-09

Working Paper
The safety and soundness effects of bank M&A in the EU

This paper studies the impact of European bank mergers and acquisitions on changes in key safety and soundness measures of both acquirers and targets. We find that capitalization, profitability, and liquidity show signs of statistically and economically significant mean reversion for acquirers. Also, acquirers in cross-border deals tended to perform better when their home country prudential supervisors and deposit insurance funding systems were stricter than the target's. For target banks, the most consistent findings from the cross-sectional regressions are that stronger supervision and ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2012-13

Working Paper
What do premiums paid for bank M&As reflect? the case of the European Union

We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 1997 and 2007. We find that acquiring banks value profitable, high-growth, and low-risk targets. We also find that the strength of bank regulation and supervision and of deposit insurance regimes in Europe has measurable effects on takeover pricing. Stricter bank regulatory regimes and stronger deposit insurance schemes lower the takeover premiums paid by acquiring banks. This result, presumably in anticipation of higher compliance costs, is mainly driven by domestic deals. Also, we find no conclusive evidence ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2010-05

Working Paper
Determinants of domestic and cross-border bank acquisitions in the European Union

This paper analyzes the determinants of bank acquisitions both within and across 25 members of the European Union (EU-25) during the period 1997?2004. Our results suggest that poorly managed banks (those with a high cost-to-income ratio) and larger banks are more likely to be acquired by other banks in the same country. The probability of being a target in a cross-border deal is larger for banks that are quoted in the stock market. Finally, banks operating in more concentrated markets are less likely to be acquired by other banks in the same country but are more likely to be acquired by banks ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2008-26

Working Paper
Cross-border banking on the two sides of the Atlantic: does it have an impact on bank crisis management?

In the United States and the European Union (EU), political incentives to oppose cross-border banking have been strong in spite of the measurable benefits to the real economy from breaking down geographic barriers. Even a federal-level supervisor and safety net are not by themselves sufficient to incentivizing cross-border banking although differences in the institutional set-up are reflected in the way the two areas responded to the crisis. The U.S. response was a coordinated response, and the cost of resolving banks was borne at the national level. Moreover, the Federal Deposit Insurance ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2015-11

Working Paper
Creating an EU-level supervisor for cross-border banking groups: Issues raised by the U.S. experience with dual banking

The European Union (EU) has been facilitating the growth of cross-border banking groups, but bank supervision remains the responsibility of national supervisors. This mismatch has long been recognized and various proposals have been offered to address this weakness. An alternative that would retain the most important advantages of full centralization is that of centralization only for those cross-border groups that are systemically important. All other banks would remain national responsibilities. To identify some of the issues (but not necessarily the best answers) raised by partial ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2011-06

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