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Author:Lagunoff, Roger 

Conference Paper
Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance

Proceedings

Working Paper
Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance

This article formalizes investor rationality and irrationality, exuberance and apprehension, to consider the implications of belief formation for the fragility of an economy's financial structure. The model presented generates a financial structure with portfolio linkages that make it susceptible to contagious financial crises, despite the absence of coordination failures. Investors forecast the likelihood of loss from contagion and may shift preemptively to safer portfolios, breaking portfolio linkages in the process. The entire financial structure collapses when the last group of investors ...
Research Working Paper , Paper 99-01

Working Paper
A model of financial fragility

This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility. The model has two essential features. First, interrelated portfolios and payment commitments forge financial linkages among agents. Second, iid shocks to investment projects? operations at a single date cause some projects to fail. Investors who experience losses from project failures reallocate their portfolios, thereby breaking some linkages. In the Pareto-efficient symmetric equilibrium studied, two related types of financial crises can occur in response. One occurs gradually as defaults spread, causing ...
Research Working Paper , Paper 98-01

Discussion Paper
On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects

This paper describes a dynamic model in which the provision mechanism for a public project is itself the object of locational choice of individuals. Individuals in an ongoing society must choose between a Majority Rule mechanism and a Voluntary Contribution mechanism. Each mechanism determines a funding decision for a local public project which is repeated over time. Generations of individuals asynchronously supercede their parents, creating an entry/exit process that allows individuals with possibly different beliefs to enter society. A self confirming equilibrium (SCE) belief process ...
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics , Paper 100

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