Working Paper
Insurance in Human Capital Models with Limited Enforcement
Krebs, Tom; Wright, Mark L. J.; Kuhn, Moritz (2016-03-26)
This paper develops a tractable human capital model with limited enforceability of contracts. The model economy is populated by a large number of long-lived, risk-averse households with homothetic preferences who can invest in risk-free physical capital and risky human capital. Households have access to a complete set of credit and insurance contracts, but their ability to use the available financial instruments is limited by the possibility of default (limited contract enforcement). We provide a convenient equilibrium characterization that facilitates the computation of recursive equilibria ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2016-8

Working Paper
Optimal Social Insurance and Rising Labor Market Risk
Scheffel, Martin; Krebs, Tom (2019-02-01)
This paper analyzes the optimal response of the social insurance system to a rise in labor market risk. To this end, we develop a tractable macroeconomic model with risk-free physical capital, risky human capital (labor market risk) and unobservable effort choice affecting the distribution of human capital shocks (moral hazard). We show that constrained optimal allocations are simple in the sense that they can be found by solving a static social planner problem. We further show that constrained optimal allocations are the equilibrium allocations of a market economy in which the government ...
Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers , Paper 18

Working Paper
Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy
Krebs, Tom; Wright, Mark L. J.; Kuhn, Moritz (2014-10-22)
We use data from the Survey of Consumer Finance and Survey of Income Program Participation to show that young households with children are under-insured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies. We develop a tractable macroeconomic model with human capital risk, age-dependent returns to human capital investment, and endogenous borrowing constraints due to the limited pledgeability of human capital (limited contract enforcement). We show analytically that, consistent with the life insurance data, in equilibrium young households are borrowing constrained and under-insured ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2014-9