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Author:Cohen, Andrew M. 

Working Paper
Differences across originators in CMBS loan underwriting

Differences in the organizational structure of CMBS loan originators may reflect differences in the incentives they face for underwriting risky loans. We treat an originator's type--that is, commercial bank, investment bank, insurance company, finance company, conduit lender, or foreign-owned entity--as a proxy for incentives related to warehousing risk, balance sheet lending, and regulatory constraints. After controlling for observable credit characteristics of over 30,000 loans securitized into CMBS after 1999, we find considerable differences in loan performance across originator types. ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2011-05

Conference Paper
Using market structure to assess differentiation between retail depository institutions

We assess the competitive impact that single-market banks and thrift institutions have on multi-market banks (and vice-versa) in 1,884 non-MSA markets. We estimate a model of equilibrium market structure which endogenizes entry for three types: multi-market banks, single-market banks, and thrift institutions. Observed market structures and the solution to an entry-type game identify the parameters of a latent (unobserved) profit function. We find significant evidence of product differentiation ? particularly in the case of thrifts. Furthermore, product differentiation appears to depend upon ...
Proceedings , Paper 940

Discussion Paper
Cyclicality and the Severity of the U.S. Supervisory Stress Test: 2014 to 2018

In this study, we provide a measure of the severity of the 2014-2018 US supervisory stress tests, and examine how that severity measure has evolved.
FEDS Notes , Paper 2019-06-07

Working Paper
Market structure and market definition: the case of small market banks and thrifts

This paper introduces a simple method to test between two general approaches to defining bank and thrift product markets. I estimate two models that endogenize market structure using data on banks and thrifts from 1,884 rural markets for the year 2000. The first model assumes that banks and thrifts are in "independent product markets," i.e., that bank profitability depends only on competition from other banks and that thrift profitability depends only on competition from other thrifts. An alternative model is then estimated assuming that banks and thrifts are "perfect strategic ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2004-02

Conference Paper
Market structure and investment strategies: the case of bank branching decisions

Proceedings , Paper 995

Conference Paper
Differences across originators iin CMBS loan underwritten

Proceedings , Paper 1123

Working Paper
Identifying price discrimination when product menus are endogenous

The standard approach to identifying second degree price discrimination is based on examining correlations between product menus and prices. When product menus are endogenous, however, tests for price discrimination may be biased by the fact that unobservables affecting costs or demand may jointly determine product menus and prices leading one to falsely infer price discrimination. Attempts to correct for this potential bias using observed product characteristics or fixed effects are shown to potentially confound inference on price discrimination leading one to reject it when firms are ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2004-10

Working Paper
A computationally efficient characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large entry games

This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from entry games with multiple equilibria.
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2005-37

Working Paper
Market structure and competition among retail depository institutions

We assess the competitive impact that single-market banks and thrift institutions have on multi-market banks (and vice-versa) in 1,884 non- MSA markets. We estimate a model of equilibrium market structure which endogenizes entry for three types: multi-market banks, single-market banks, and thrift institutions. Observed market structures and the solution to an entry-type game identify the parameters of a latent (unobserved) profit function. We find significant evidence of product differentiation-- particularly in the case of thrifts. Furthermore, product differentiation appears to depend upon ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2004-04

Working Paper
Competition, product differentiation and quality provision: an empirical equilibrium analysis of bank branching decisions

We analyze the effects of market structure on the branching decisions of three types of depository institution: multimarket banks, single-market banks, and thrift institutions. We argue that additional branches increase quality for an institution's consumers, and examine the interaction between market structure and this particular measure of quality. We account for endogenous market structure using an equilibrium structural model, which corrects for bias caused by correlation in the unobservables that may drive entry and branching activity. We estimate the model using data from over 1,750 ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2004-46

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