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Working Paper
Competition or collaboration? The reciprocity effect in loan syndication
It is well recognized that loan syndication generates a moral hazard problem by diluting the lead arranger's incentive to monitor the borrower. This paper proposes and tests a novel view that reciprocal arrangements among lead arrangers serve as an effective mechanism to mitigate this agency problem. Lender arrangements in about seven out of ten syndicated loans are reciprocal in the sense that lead arrangers also participate in loans that are led by their participant lenders. I develop a model in which syndicate lenders share reciprocity through such arrangements in a repeated-game setting ...
Journal Article
Compensation and risk incentives in banking and finance
We review why executive compensation contracts are often structured the way they are, analyze risk incentives stemming from various pay schemes, and examine the tendency of the banking and finance industry toward excessive risk-taking. Studying the typical executive pay structures in banking and finance before the financial crisis reveals some potentially problematic practices. These practices may have encouraged ?short-termism? and excessive risk-taking, which are two behaviors bank regulators aim to prevent with their recently issued guidance on incentive compensation.