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Working Paper
Fixed-premium deposit insurance and international credit crunches
We introduce a monopolistically-competitive model of foreign lending in which both explicit and implicit fixed-premium deposit insurance increase the degree to which bank participation in relending to problem debtors falls below its globally optimal level. This provides a channel for fixed-premium deposit insurance to inhibit credit extension in bad states, resulting in an increase in the expected default percentage and an increase in the expected burden on the deposit insurance institution.
Report
International business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Stockman and Tesar (1995) find two major discrepancies between standard international business cycle models with complete markets and the data: In the models, cross-country correlations are much higher for consumption than for output, while in the data the opposite is true; and cross-country correlations of employment and investment are negative, while in the data they are positive. This paper introduces a friction into a standard model that helps resolve these anomalies. The friction is that international loans are imperfectly ...
Report
Global banks and international shock transmission: evidence from the crisis
Global banks played a significant role in transmitting the 2007-09 financial crisis to emerging-market economies. We examine adverse liquidity shocks on main developed-country banking systems and their relationships to emerging markets across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, isolating loan supply from loan demand effects. Loan supply in emerging markets across Europe, Asia, and Latin America was affected significantly through three separate channels: 1) a contraction in direct, cross-border lending by foreign banks; 2) a contraction in local lending by foreign banks' affiliates in emerging ...
Journal Article
A balanced approach to the LDC debt problem
Journal Article
International \"middle-market\" borrowing
Journal Article
Fixed-premium deposit insurance and international credit crunches
This article introduces a monopolistically competitive model of foreign lending in which both explicit and implicit fixed-premium deposit insurance increase the degree to which bank participation in relending to problem debtors falls below its globally optimal level. This provides a channel for fixed-premium deposit insurance to inhibit credit extension in bad states, resulting in an increase in the expected default percentage and an increase in the expected burden on the deposit insurance institutions.
Journal Article
International debt with unenforceable claims
Conference Paper
New evidence on the international bank lending channel