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Keywords:Crisis 

Journal Article
Central Bank Lending in a Liquidity Crisis

Solvent banks may appear insolvent in the midst of a liquidity crisis, due to the plunge of their assets? value below their normal value. The responsibility of the central bank is to provide liquidity to the banks that would be solvent under normal economic conditions, at lending terms consistent with normal market conditions.
Economic Commentary , Issue April

Discussion Paper
Have the Risk Profiles of Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies Changed?

After the global financial crisis, regulatory changes were implemented to support financial stability, with some changes directly addressing capital and liquidity in bank holding companies (BHCs) and others targeting BHC size and complexity. Although the overall size of the largest U.S. BHCs has not decreased since the crisis, the organizational complexity of these same organizations has declined, with less notable changes being observed in their range of businesses and geographic scope (Goldberg and Meehl, forthcoming). In this post, we explore how different types of BHC risks—risks that ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20200203

Discussion Paper
Turnover in Fedwire Funds Has Dropped Considerably since the Crisis, but It's Okay

The Fedwire Funds Service is a large-value payment system, operated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, that facilitates more than $3 trillion a day in payments. Turnover in Fedwire Funds, the value of payments made for every dollar of liquidity provided, has dropped nearly 75 percent since the crisis. Should we be concerned? In this post, we explain why turnover has dropped so much and argue that it is, in fact, a good thing.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20140825

Working Paper
A Price-Differentiation Model of the Interbank Market and Its Application to a Financial Crisis

Rate curves for overnight loans between bank pairs, as functions of loan values, can be used to infer valuation of reserves by banks. The inferred valuation can be used to interpret shifts in rate curves between bank pairs, for example, in response to a financial crisis. This paper proposes a model of lending by a small bank to a large monopolistic bank to generate a tractable rate curve. An explicit calibration procedure for model parameters is developed and applied to a dataset from Mexico around the 2008 financial crisis. During the crisis, relatively small banks were lending to large ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-065

Discussion Paper
Is Stigma Attached to the European Central Bank's Marginal Lending Facility?

The European Central Bank (ECB)’s marginal lending facility has been used by banks to borrow funds both in normal times and during the crisis that started in 2007. In this post, we argue that how a central bank communicates the purpose of a facility is important in determining how users of the facility are perceived. In particular, the ECB never refers to the marginal lending facility as a back-up source of funds. The ECB’s neutral approach may be a key factor in explaining why financial institutions are less reluctant to use the marginal lending facility than the Fed’s discount window.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20180416

Working Paper
The Impact of Missed Payments and Foreclosures on Credit Scores

This paper debunks the common perception that ?foreclosure will ruin your credit score.? Using individual-level data from a credit bureau matched with loan-level mortgage data, it is estimated that the very first missed mortgage payment leads to the biggest reduction in credit scores. The effects of subsequent loan impairments are increasingly muted. Post-delinquency foreclosures have only a minimal effect on credit scores. Moreover, credit scores improve substantially a year after borrowers experience 90-day delinquency or foreclosure. The data supports one possible explanation of this ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 1423

Discussion Paper
Options of Last Resort

During the global financial crisis of 2007-08, collateral markets became illiquid, making it difficult for dealers to obtain short-term funding to finance their positions. As lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve responded with various programs to promote liquidity in these markets, including the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). In this post, we describe an additional and rarely discussed liquidity facility introduced by the Fed during the crisis: the TSLF Options Program (TOP). The TOP was unique among crisis-period liquidity facilities in ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20180226

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