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Discussion Paper
The Growing Risk of Spillovers and Spillbacks in the Bank‑NBFI Nexus
Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) are growing, but banks support that growth via funding and liquidity insurance. The transformation of activities and risks from banks to a bank-NBFI nexus may have benefits in normal states of the world, as it may result in overall growth in (especially, credit) markets and widen access to a wide range of financial services, but the system may be disproportionately exposed to financial and economic instability when aggregate tail risk materializes. In this post, we consider the systemic implications of the observed build-up of bank-NBFI connections ...
Report
Intermediation Frictions in Debt Relief: Evidence from CARES Act Forbearance
We study how intermediaries—mortgage servicers—shaped the implementation of mortgage forbearance during the COVID-19 pandemic and use servicer-level variation to trace out the causal effect of forbearance on borrowers. Forbearance provision varied widely across servicers. Small servicers and nonbanks, especially nonbanks with small liquidity buffers, facilitated fewer forbearances and saw a higher incidence of forbearance-related complaints. Easier access to forbearance substantially increased mortgage nonpayment but also reduced delinquencies outside of forbearance. Part of the liquidity ...
Discussion Paper
Banks and Nonbanks Are Not Separate, but Interwoven
In our previous post, we documented the significant growth of nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) over the past decade, but also argued for and showed evidence of NBFIs’ dependence on banks for funding and liquidity support. In this post, we explain that the observed growth of NBFIs reflects banks optimally changing their business models in response to factors such as regulation, rather than banks stepping away from lending and risky activities and being substituted by NBFIs. The enduring bank-NBFI nexus is best understood as an ever-evolving transformation of risks that were hitherto ...
Working Paper
Defining Households That Are Underserved in Digital Payment Services
US households that lack digital means of making and receiving payments cannot participate fully in an increasingly digitized economy. Assessing the scope of this problem and addressing it requires a definition of households that are underserved in digital payments. Traditional definitions of households underserved in the banking system—those that are unbanked and those that are underbanked—do not account for the ownership of nonbank transaction accounts that can be used to make and receive digital payments. In this paper, we define households underserved in digital payments by considering ...
Discussion Paper
Are Nonbank Financial Institutions Systemic?
Recent events have heightened awareness of systemic risk stemming from nonbank financial sectors. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, liquidity demand from nonbank financial entities caused a “dash for cash” in financial markets that required government support. In this post, we provide a quantitative assessment of systemic risk in the nonbank sectors. Even though these sectors have heterogeneous business models, ranging from insurance to trading and asset management, we find that their systemic risk has common variation, and this commonality has increased over time. Moreover, ...
Working Paper
Non-Bank Financial Institutions and Banks’ Fire-Sale Vulnerabilities
Banks carry significant exposures to nonbanks from direct dealings, but they can also be exposed, indirectly, through losses in asset values resulting from fire-sale events. We assess the vulnerability of U.S. banks to fire sales potentially originating from any of twelve separate non-bank segments and identify network-like externalities driven by the interconnectedness across non-bank types in terms of asset holdings. We document that such network externalities can contribute to very large multiples of an original fire sale, thus suggesting that conventional assessments of fire-sale ...
Report
Where Do Banks End and NBFIs Begin?
In recent years, assets of nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) have grown significantly relative to those of banks. These two sectors are commonly viewed either as operating in parallel, performing different activities, or as substitutes, performing substantially similar activities, with banks inside and NBFIs outside the perimeter of banking regulation. We argue instead that NBFI and bank businesses and risks are so interwoven that they are better described as having transformed over time, rather than as having migrated from banks to NBFIs. These transformations are at least in part a ...
Discussion Paper
The Rise in Mortgage Fees: Evidence from HMDA Data
Although rising mortgage interest rates between 2022 and 2023 captured headlines, the cost of upfront mortgage fees also increased significantly during that time. Using new Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data on fees, collected since 2018, we estimate that borrowers’ out-of-pocket upfront costs for getting a home purchase mortgage rose nearly 33 percent from 2021 to 2023, to almost $6,500. We document that the main driver of this increase has been rising payments of “discount points,” as opposed to other types of lender fees and third-party fees. We show that loans originated by nonbanks, ...
Working Paper
Zombie Lending to U.S. Firms
We show that U.S. banks do not engage in zombie lending to firms of deteriorating profitability, irrespective of capital levels and exposure to such firms. In contrast, unregulated financial intermediaries do, originating more and cheaper loans to these firms. We establish these results using supervisory data on firm-bank relationships, syndicated lending data for banks and nonbanks, and an empirical setting with quasi-random shocks to firm profitability. Although credit migrates from banks to nonbanks, zombie firms file for bankruptcy at an elevated rate, suggesting that nonbanks’ zombie ...
Report
Non-Bank Financial Institutions and Banks’ Fire-Sale Vulnerabilities
Banks carry significant exposures to nonbanks from direct dealings, but they can also be exposed, indirectly, through losses in asset values resulting from fire-sale events. We assess the vulnerability of U.S. banks to fire sales potentially originating from any of twelve separate nonbank segments and identify network-like externalities driven by the interconnectedness across nonbank types in terms of asset holdings. We document that such network externalities can contribute to very large multiples of an original fire sale, thus suggesting that conventional assessments of fire-sale ...