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Showing results 1 to 7 of approximately 7.
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Speech
Some Perspectives on Regulatory Reform Proposals
Remarks at the Institute of Regulation & Risk North Asia March 30, 2010, Hong Kong, China
Working Paper
The Optimal Response of Bank Capital Requirements to Credit and Risk in a Model with Financial Spillovers
This paper studies optimal bank capital requirements in an economy where bank losses have financial spillovers. The spillovers amplify the effects of shocks, making the banking system and the economy less stable. The spillovers increase with banks? financial distortions, which in turn increase with banks? credit risk. Higher capital requirements dampen the current supply of banks? credit, but mitigate banks? future financial distortions. Capital requirements should be raised in response to both an expansion of banks? credit supply and an increase in the expected future credit risk of banks. ...
Report
Cournot Fire Sales
In standard Walrasian macro-finance models, pecuniary externalities due to fire sales lead to excessive borrowing and insufficient liquidity holdings. We investigate whether imperfect competition (Cournot) improves welfare through internalizing the externality and find that this is far from guaranteed. Cournot competition can overcorrect the inefficiently high borrowing in a standard model of levered real investment. In contrast, Cournot competition can exacerbate the inefficiently low liquidity in a standard model of financial portfolio choice. Implications for welfare and regulation are ...
Speech
The International Financial Crisis: Asset Price Exuberance and Macroprudential Regulation
Remarks by Charles L. Evans, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 2009 International Banking Conference Chicago, IL
Report
Macroprudential policy and the revolving door of risk: lessons from leveraged lending guidance
We investigate the U.S. experience with macroprudential policies by studying the interagency guidance on leveraged lending. We find that the guidance primarily impacted large, closely supervised banks, but only after supervisors issued important clarifications. It also triggered a migration of leveraged lending to nonbanks. While we do not find that nonbanks had more lax lending policies than banks, we unveil important evidence that nonbanks increased bank borrowing following the issuance of guidance, possibly to finance their growing leveraged lending. The guidance was effective at reducing ...
Working Paper
Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination
This paper examines the incentives of national regulators to coordinate regulatory policies in the presence of systemic risk in global financial markets. In a two-country and three-period model, correlated asset fire sales by banks generate systemic risk across national financial markets. Relaxing regulatory standards in one country increases both the cost and the severity of crises for both countries in this framework. In the absence of coordination, independent regulators choose inefficiently low levels of macro-prudential regulation. A central regulator internalizes the systemic risk and ...
Working Paper
Macroeconomic Policy Games
Strategic interactions between policymakers arise whenever each policymaker has distinct objectives. Deviating from full cooperation can result in large welfare losses. To facilitate the study of strategic interactions, we develop a toolbox that characterizes the welfare-maximizing cooperative Ramsey policies under full commitment and open-loop Nash games. Two examples for the use of our toolbox offer some novel results. The first example revisits the case of monetary policy coordination in a two-country model to confirm that our approach replicates well-known results in the literature and ...