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Report
Cournot Fire Sales
In standard Walrasian macro-finance models, pecuniary externalities due to fire sales lead to excessive borrowing and insufficient liquidity holdings. We investigate whether imperfect competition (Cournot) improves welfare through internalizing the externality and find that this is far from guaranteed. Cournot competition can overcorrect the inefficiently high borrowing in a standard model of levered real investment. In contrast, Cournot competition can exacerbate the inefficiently low liquidity in a standard model of financial portfolio choice. Implications for welfare and regulation are ...
Speech
Simplicity, transparency, and market discipline in regulatory reform
"Enhancing Prudential Standards in Financial Regulations," cohosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the Wharton Financial Institutions Center, and the Journal of Financial Services Research. Philadelphia, PA. President Plosser explores simplicity in regulatory rules, transparency in financial instruments, and the role of market forces in controlling risk-taking and enhancing supervision.
Working Paper
On the Measurement of Large Financial Firm Resolvability
We say that a large financial institution is "resolvable" if policymakers would allow it to go through unassisted bankruptcy in the event of failure. The choice between bankruptcy or bailout trades off the higher loss imposed on the economy in a potentially disruptive resolution against the incentive for excessive risk-taking created by an assisted resolution or a bailout. The resolution plans ("living wills") of large financial institutions contain information needed to evaluate this trade-off. In this paper, we propose a tool to complement the living will review process: an impact score ...
Report
Complexity and Riskiness of Banking Organizations: Evidence from the International Banking Research Network
Complexity of banks can have important ramifications for the performance and the risks of the banking system. Financial sector reforms that were implemented in the past decade have thus aimed to reduce and to better manage the risk implications of bank complexity. Yet, surprisingly little is known about changes in complexity across countries, its drivers, and its effects. The International Banking Research Network (IBRN) used data and analytical advances to generate rich cross-country insights on the complexity and riskiness of banking organizations. The initiative has yielded four key ...
Working Paper
Enhancing prudential standards in financial regulations
The financial crisis has generated fundamental reforms in the financial regulatory system in the U.S. and internationally. Much of this reform was in direct response to the weaknesses revealed in the precrisis system. The new ?macroprudential? approach to financial regulations focuses on risks arising in financial markets broadly, as well as the potential impact on the financial system that may arise from financial distress at systemically important financial institutions. Systemic risk is the key factor in financial stability, but our current understanding of systemic risk is rather limited. ...
Speech
Welcome Remarks to US-MENA Private Sector Dialogue Conference
Remarks to US-MENA Private Sector Dialogue Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.
Speech
The importance of incentives in ensuring a resilient and robust financial system: remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
Working Paper
Financing Modes and Lender Monitoring
Shadow banks are widely believed to be a creation of financial regulation and regulatory arbitrage. We show that bank and nonbank modes of financing can emerge endogenously in a simple borrower-lender framework absent regulatory arbitrage or policy interventions. The coexistence of banks and shadow banks in the absence of regulatory intervention speaks to the importance of shadow banks as alternative modes of financial intermediation. We explore the scope of regulation in determining the size and location of shadow banking, as opposed to how regulation can be designed to curtail shadow bank ...
Working Paper
Federal Reserve Structure, Economic Ideas, and Monetary and Financial Policy
The decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System is evaluated as a mechanism for generating and processing new ideas on monetary and financial policy. The role of the Reserve Banks starting in the 1960s is emphasized. The introduction of monetarism in the 1960s, rational expectations in the 1970s, credibility in the 1980s, transparency, and other monetary policy ideas by Reserve Banks into the Federal Reserve System is documented. Contributions by Reserve Banks to policy on bank structure, bank regulation, and lender of last resort are also discussed. We argue that the Reserve Banks ...
Discussion Paper
Peeling the Onion: A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies
When market observers talk about a “bank,” they are generally not referring to a single legal entity. Instead, large domestic banking organizations are almost always organized according to a bank holding company (BHC) structure, in which a U.S. parent holding company controls up to several thousand separate subsidiaries. This hierarchy of controlled entities generally includes domestic commercial banks primarily focused on lending and deposit-taking as well as a range of nonbanking and foreign firms engaged in a diverse set of business activities, such as securities dealing and ...