Search Results
Briefing
Intermediation and Bank Liquidity: A Conference Recap
How might a central bank digital currency alter banking system operations? What is the effect of credit easing on the dynamics of bank runs? Does increased competition among banks mean a more fragile banking system, and what can be done about it? These were among the research questions addressed by economists during a recent Richmond Fed research conference.
Journal Article
Digital Currency, Digital Payments, and the 'Last Mile' to the Unbanked
Digital forms of payment are either not accessible or highly costly for unbanked consumers. This is because these forms of payment must be "funded" by some source of money, such as cash or a bank account. That creates the "last-mile" problem for the unbanked. This article examines various solutions for the funding problem that have been proposed in the literature, by regulators, and in bills submitted to Congress.
Speech
Remarks at the Panel Discussion, “Central Bank Perspectives on Central Bank Digital Currencies”
The topic of central bank digital currencies is certainly of interest to the Federal Reserve and other nations’ central banks around the world. Like others, the Federal Reserve System is considering both the technical and policy issues surrounding all aspects of a central bank digital currency. In my brief remarks today on the panel, I will touch on several of these key considerations.
Journal Article
Should the US Issue a Central Bank Digital Currency?
If the web 3.0 requires a public ledger–based payments platform, central bank digital currency (CBDC) is unlikely to provide the digital currency needed to fuel the smart contracts of tomorrow. This payments dilemma can be solved by a hybrid digital currency that includes a new type of bank deposit as well as regulated private stablecoins, both of which clear and settle on a next-generation public ledger created and managed as a joint venture between banks and private stablecoin issuers. With this payments platform under Federal Reserve oversight, there would be no need for the Federal ...
Working Paper
Central Bank Digital Currency: Financial Inclusion vs. Disintermediation
An overlapping-generations model with income heterogeneity is developed to analyze the impact of introducing a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) on financial inclusion, and its potential adverse effect on bank funding. We highlight the role of two design parameters: the fixed cost of CBDC usage and the interest rate it pays, and derive principles for maximum inclusion and for mitigating the inclusion-intermediation trade-off. Agents’ choice of money instrument is endogenously driven by income heterogeneity. Pre-CBDC, wealthier agents adopt deposits, while poorer agents adopt cash and ...
Journal Article
Should the United States Issue a Central Bank Digital Currency? Lessons from Abroad
If the web 3.0 requires a public ledger–based payments platform, central bank digital currency (CBDC) is unlikely to provide the digital currency needed to fuel the smart contracts of tomorrow. This payments dilemma can be solved by a hybrid digital currency that includes a new type of bank deposit as well as regulated private stablecoins, both of which clear and settle on a next-generation public ledger created and managed as a joint venture between banks and private stablecoin issuers. With this payments platform under Federal Reserve oversight, there would be no need for the Federal ...
Working Paper
Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking for All?
The introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) allows the central bank to engage in large-scale intermediation by competing with private financial interme-diaries for deposits. Yet, since a central bank is not an investment expert, it cannot invest in long-term projects itself, but relies on investment banks to do so. We derive an equivalence result that shows that absent a banking panic, the set of allocations achieved with private financial intermediation will also be achieved with a CBDC. Dur-ing a panic, however, we show that the rigidity of the central bank’s contract ...