Search Results
Report
Supervising large, complex financial companies: what do supervisors do?
The Federal Reserve is responsible for the prudential supervision of bank holding companies (BHCs) on a consolidated basis. Prudential supervision involves monitoring and oversight to assess whether these firms are engaged in unsafe or unsound practices, as well as ensuring that firms are taking corrective actions to address such practices. Prudential supervision is interlinked with, but distinct from, regulation, which involves the development and promulgation of the rules under which BHCs and other regulated financial intermediaries operate. This paper describes the Federal Reserve?s ...
Discussion Paper
Can I Speak to Your Supervisor? The Importance of Bank Supervision
In March of 2023, the U.S. banking industry experienced a period of significant turmoil involving runs on several banks and heightened concerns about contagion. While many factors contributed to these events—including poor risk management, lapses in firm governance, outsized exposures to interest rate risk, and unrecognized vulnerabilities from interconnected depositor bases, the role of bank supervisors came under particular scrutiny. Questions were raised about why supervisors did not intervene more forcefully before problems arose. In response, supervisory agencies, including the Federal ...
Speech
Climate Change and Risk Management in Bank Supervision
Remarks at Risks, Opportunities, and Investment in the Era of Climate Change, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts.
Working Paper
The Failure of supervisory stress testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere have adopted stress testing as a central tool for supervising large, complex, financial institutions and promoting financial stability. Although supervisory stress testing may confer substantial benefits, such tests are vulnerable to model risk. This paper studies the risk-based capital stress test conducted by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that are central to the U.S. housing finance ...
Speech
Keynote Address at the Institute for International Bankers Annual Seminar on Risk Management and Regulatory Examination/Compliance Issues
Keynote Address at the Institute for International Bankers Annual Seminar on Risk Management and Regulatory Examination/Compliance Issues.
Journal Article
Why Do Supervisors Rate Banking Organizations?
This article addresses a question that at first may appear simple: why do supervisors rate banking organizations? Prudential supervisors have a long-standing practice of confidentially rating the condition of the firms that they supervise. These ratings are used for a variety of purposes and can have important consequences. The authors analyze the history and evolution of this practice and consider how the use of ratings advances the statutory and regulatory goals of supervision of banking organizations. They conclude with a discussion of the implications for the design and implementation of ...
Working Paper
Designing Market Shock Scenarios
We propose an approach for generating financial market scenarios for stress testing financial firms' market risk exposures. This approach can be used by industry practitioners and regulators for their stress scenario design. Our approach attempts to maximize risk capture with a relatively small number of scenarios. A single scenario could miss potential vulnerabilities, while stress tests using a large number of scenarios could be operationally costly. The approach has two components. First, we model relationships among market risk factors to set scenario shock magnitudes consistently across ...
Report
Parsing the content of bank supervision
We measure bank supervision using the database of supervisory issues, known as matters requiring attention or immediate attention, raised by Federal Reserve examiners to banking organizations. The volume of supervisory issues increases with banks? asset size, especially for the largest and most complex banks, and decreases with profitability and the quality of the loan portfolio. Stressed banks are faster at resolving issues, but all else equal, resolving new issues takes longer the more issues a bank faces, which may suggest capacity constraints in addressing multiple supervisory issues. ...
Report
Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade-offs and Outcomes
We estimate a structural model of resource allocation on work hours of Federal Reserve bank supervisors to disentangle how supervisory technology, preferences, and resource constraints impact bank outcomes. We find a significant effect of supervision on bank risk and large technological scale economies with respect to bank size. Consistent with macro-prudential objectives, revealed supervisory preferences disproportionately weight larger banks, especially post-2008 when a resource reallocation to larger banks increased risk on average across all banks. Shadow cost estimates show tight ...
Working Paper
Scenario-based Quantile Connectedness of the U.S. Interbank Liquidity Risk Network
We characterize the U.S. interbank liquidity risk network based on a supervisory dataset, using a scenario-based quantile network connectedness approach. In terms of methodology, we consider a quantile vector autoregressive model with unobserved heterogeneity and propose a Bayesian nuclear norm estimation method. A common factor structure is employed to deal with unobserved heterogeneity that may exhibit endogeneity within the network. Then we develop a scenario-based quantile network connectedness framework by accommodating various economic scenarios, through a scenario-based moving average ...