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Keywords:GSE 

Working Paper
Eviction Risk of Rental Housing: Does It Matter How Your Landlord Finances the Property?

We show, using a stylized model, how the financing choice of landlords can impact eviction decisions in rental markets. Since multifamily loans rely on timely cash flows from tenants, strict underwriting factors can increase the chances that landlords are able to weather income shocks. Lender provided relief may create further leeway for landlords to work out a deal with tenants who default on rental payments. Using comprehensive data on nationwide evictions in the U.S. and performance records on multifamily mortgages, we confirm predictions from our model by documenting a negative ...
Working Papers , Paper 21-05

Report
Credit risk transfer and de facto GSE reform

We summarize and evaluate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?s credit risk transfer (CRT) programs, which have been used since 2013 to shift a portion of credit risk on more than $1.8 trillion of mortgages to private sector investors. We argue that the CRT programs have been successful in reducing the exposure of the federal government to mortgage credit risk without disrupting the liquidity or stability of mortgage secondary markets. In the process, the programs have created a new financial market for pricing and trading mortgage credit risk, which has grown in size and liquidity over time. The CRT ...
Staff Reports , Paper 838

Journal Article
Credit risk transfer and de facto GSE reform

The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac credit risk transfer (CRT) programs, now in their fifth year, shift a portion of credit risk on more than $1.8 trillion of mortgages to private-sector investors. This study summarizes and evaluates the CRT programs, finding that they have been successful in reducing the exposure of the government-sponsored enterprises and the federal government to mortgage credit risk without disrupting the liquidity or stability of mortgage secondary markets. The programs have also created a new financial market for pricing and trading mortgage credit risk, which has grown in ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue 24-3 , Pages 88-116

Working Paper
HOUSING SPECULATION, GSES, AND CREDIT MARKET SPILLOVERS

In 2021, the U.S. Treasury reduced the exposure of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to speculative mortgages. As a result, GSE purchases of these loans fell by about 20 percentage points. The consequent decline in credit to speculators, however, was mitigated both by entry of corporate investors and because banks began holding more of these loans. By increasing bank exposure to local risk, this move reduced banks’ willingness to supply both jumbo mortgages and small business loans. Our empirical design fully accounts for risks at the balance sheet level. Banks thus manage credit not ...
Working Papers , Paper 24-02

Report
A private lender cooperative model for residential mortgage finance

We describe a set of six design principles for the reorganization of the U.S. housing finance system and apply them to one model for replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that has so far received frequent mention but little sustained analysis ? the lender cooperative utility. We discuss the pros and cons of such a model and propose a method for organizing participation in a mutual loss pool and an explicit, priced government insurance mechanism. We also discuss how these principles and this model are consistent with preserving the ?to-be-announced,? or TBA, market ? particularly if the ...
Staff Reports , Paper 466

Report
The capital structure and governance of a mortgage securitization utility

We explore the capital structure and governance of a mortgage-insuring securitization utility operating with government reinsurance for systemic or ?tail? risk. The structure we propose for the replacement of the GSEs focuses on aligning incentives for appropriate pricing and transfer of mortgage risks across the private sector and between the private sector and the government. We present the justification and mechanics of a vintage-based capital structure, and assess the components of the mortgage guarantee fee, whose size we find is most sensitive to the required capital ratio and the ...
Staff Reports , Paper 644

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