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Keywords:Bank capital 

Journal Article
Robust capital regulation

Regulators and markets can find the balance sheets of large financial institutions difficult to penetrate, and they are mindful of how undercapitalization can create incentives to take on excessive risk. This study proposes a novel framework for capital regulation that addresses banks' incentives to take on excessive risk and leverage. The framework consists of a special capital account in addition to a core capital requirement. The special account would accrue to a bank's shareholders as long as the bank is solvent, but would pass to the bank's regulators?rather than its creditors?if the ...
Current Issues in Economics and Finance , Volume 18 , Issue May

Journal Article
Capital treatment of trust preferred securities changes

Financial Update , Volume 18 , Issue Q 3

Journal Article
Market risk and bank capital: part 2

FRBSF Economic Letter

Conference Paper
Deposit insurance, capital regulation, and bank risk

Proceedings , Paper 114

Journal Article
Variable capital rules in a risky world

The recent financial crisis showed that a financial institution's equity may be sufficient to absorb losses during normal times, but insufficient during periods of systemic distress. In recognition of this risk, the Basel III agreement last year introduced a new element of macroprudential regulation called countercyclical buffers, variable capital requirements that shift based on credit growth. These buffers raise the classic regulatory dilemma of safety versus economic growth, but may provide protection against financial calamity at an acceptable cost.
FRBSF Economic Letter

Conference Paper
Social capital and the cost of business loan contracting

Proceedings , Paper 792

Conference Paper
Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking

Proceedings , Paper 809

Journal Article
Rebalancing the three pillars of Basel II

The author observes that the three pillars of Basel II seem uneven: Pillars 1 and 2 have eclipsed Pillar 3 - market discipline and disclosure - in the Basle Committee's deliberations. He works through a banking model of the three Pillars, shows how the optimal liquidation limit varies with bank liability structure and the regulatory regime, and argues that market discipline, via mandatory subordinated debt issuance, can reduce forbearance by supervisors.
Economic Policy Review , Issue Sep , Pages 7-21

Journal Article
Risk-based capital standards and bank portfolios

FRBSF Economic Letter

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