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Jel Classification:H63 

Working Paper
The (Unintended?) Consequences of the Largest Liquidity Injection Ever

We study the design of lender of last resort interventions and show that the provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes purchases of high-yield short-term securities by banks. Using a unique security-level data set, we find that the European Central Bank?s three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation incentivized Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds that could be pledged to obtain central bank liquidity. This "collateral trade" effect is large, as banks purchased short-term bonds equivalent to 8.4% of amount outstanding. The resumption of public debt issuance ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-011

Report
The Monetary and Fiscal History of Brazil, 1960-2016

Brazil has had a long period of high inflation. It peaked around 100 percent per year in 1964, decreased until the first oil shock (1973), but accelerated again afterward, reaching levels above 100 percent on average between 1980 and 1994. This last period coincided with severe balance of payments problems and economic stagnation that followed the external debt crisis in the early 1980s. We show that the high-inflation period (1960-1994) was characterized by a combination of fiscal deficits, passive monetary policy, and constraints on debt financing. The transition to the low-inflation period ...
Staff Report , Paper 575

Working Paper
Selective Sovereign Defaults

Governments issue debt both domestically and abroad. This heterogeneity introduces the possibility for governments to operate selective defaults that discriminate across investors. Using a novel dataset on the legal jurisdiction of sovereign defaults that distinguishes between defaults under domestic law and default under foreign law, we show that selectiveness is the norm and that imports, credit, and output dynamics are different around different types of default. Domestic defaults are associated with contractions of credit and are more likely in countries with smaller credit markets. In ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1239

Working Paper
Deconstructing Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructuring

Negotiations to restructure sovereign debt are time consuming, taking almost a decade on average to resolve. In this paper, we analyze a class of widely used complete information models of delays in sovereign debt restructuring and show that, despite superficial similarities, there are major differences across models in the driving force for equilibrium delay, the circumstances in which delay occurs, and the efficiency of the debt restructuring process. We focus on three key assumptions. First, if delay has a permanent effect on economic activity in the defaulting country, equilibrium delay ...
Working Papers , Paper 753

Working Paper
Treasury Safety, Liquidity, and Money Premium Dynamics: Evidence from Recent Debt Limit Impasses

Treasury securities normally possess unparalleled safety and liquidity and, consequently, carry a money premium. We use recent debt limit impasses, which temporarily increased the riskiness of Treasuries, to investigate the relationship between the money premium, safety, and liquidity. Our results shed light on Treasury market dynamics specifically, and debt more generally. We first establish that a decline in the perceived safety of Treasuries erodes the money premium at all times. Meanwhile, changes in liquidity only affected the money premium during the impasses. Next, we show that ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-008

Working Paper
Avoiding Sovereign Default Contagion: A Normative Analysis

Should debtor countries support each other during sovereign debt crises? We answer this question through the lens of a two-country sovereign-default model that we calibrate to the euro-area periphery. First, we look at cross-country bailouts. We find that whenever agents anticipate their existence, bailouts induce moral hazard an reduce welfare. Second, we look at the borrowing choices of a global central borrower. We find that it borrows less than individual governments and, as such, defaults become less frequent and welfare increases. Finally, we show that central borrower's policies can be ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1275

Working Paper
A Neoclassical Model of the World Financial Cycle

Emerging markets face large and persistent fluctuations in sovereign spreads. To what extent are these fluctuations driven by local shocks versus financial conditions in advanced economies? To answer this question, we develop a neoclassical business cycle model of a world economy with an advanced country, the North, and many emerging market economies, the South. Northern households invest in domestic stocks, domestic defaultable bonds, and international sovereign debt. Over the 2008-2016 period, the global cycle phase, the North accounts for 68% of Southern spreads' fluctuations. Over the ...
Working Papers , Paper 25-06

Working Paper
Bank and sovereign risk feedback loops

Measures of Sovereign and Bank Risk show occasional bouts of increased correlation, setting the stage for vicious and virtuous feedback loops. This paper models the macroeconomic phenomena underlying such bouts using CDS data for 10 euro-area countries. The results show that Sovereign Risk feeds back into Bank Risk more strongly than vice versa. Countries with sovereigns that are more indebted or where banks have a larger exposure to their own sovereign, suffer larger feedback loop effects from Sovereign Risk into Bank Risk. In the opposite direction, in countries where banks fund their ...
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 227

Working Paper
Is Inflation Default? The Role of Information in Debt Crises

We consider a two-period Bayesian trading game where in each period informed agents decide whether to buy an asset ("government debt") after observing an idiosyncratic signal about the prospects of default. While second-period buyers only need to forecast default, first-period buyers pass the asset to the new agents in the secondary market, and thus need to form beliefs about the price that will prevail at that stage. We provide conditions such that coarser information in the hands of second-period agents makes the price of debt more resilient to bad shocks not only in the last period, but ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2017-6

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Garbade, Kenneth D. 7 items

Karantounias, Anastasios G. 7 items

Erce, Aitor 6 items

D'Erasmo, Pablo 4 items

Fleming, Michael J. 4 items

Mallucci, Enrico 4 items

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F34 21 items

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sovereign defaults 7 items

Sovereign default 5 items

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multiplier preferences 4 items

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