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Jel Classification:G30 

Report
Financial visibility and the decision to go private

A large fraction of the companies that went private between 1990 and 2007 were fairly young public firms, often with the same management team making the crucial restructuring decisions both at the time of the initial public offering (IPO) and the buyout. Why did these public firms decide to revert to private ownership? To answer this question, we investigate the determinants of the decision to go private over a firm's entire public life cycle. Our evidence reveals that firms with declining growth in analyst coverage, falling institutional ownership, and low stock turnover were more likely to ...
Staff Reports , Paper 376

Working Paper
Reorganization or Liquidation: Bankruptcy Choice and Firm Dynamics

In this paper, we ask how bankruptcy law affects the financial decisions of corporations and its implications for firm dynamics. According to current U.S. law, firms have two bankruptcy options: Chapter 7 liquidation and Chapter 11 reorganization. Using Compustat data, we first document capital structure and investment decisions of non-bankrupt, Chapter 11, and Chapter 7 firms. Using those data moments, we then estimate parameters of a general equilibrium firm dynamics model with endogenous entry and exit to include both bankruptcy options. Finally, we evaluate a bankruptcy policy change ...
Working Papers , Paper 769

Working Paper
Incentive Contracting Under Ambiguity Aversion

This paper studies a principal-agent model in which the information on future firm performance is ambiguous and the agent is averse to ambiguity. We show that if firm risk is ambiguous, while stocks always induce the agent to perceive a high risk, options can induce him to perceive a low risk. As a result, options can be less costly in incentivizing the agent than stocks in the presence of ambiguity. In addition, we show that providing the agent with more incentives would induce the agent to perceive a higher risk, and there is a discontinuous jump in the compensation cost as incentives ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1195

Working Paper
Do Costly Internal Equity Injections Reveal Bank Expectations about Post-Crisis Real Outcomes?

We construct a novel signal of bank expectations utilizing confidential data and a regulatory constraint imposed on bank internal capital markets during the 2008 crisis that made internal equity injections to commercial bank subsidiaries difficult to reverse. When the US government initiated a $176 billion recapitalization program during the crisis, this constraint made it costly ex-ante for multi-bank holding companies (MBHC) to use these funds for the purpose of recapitalizing subsidiaries against future anticipated losses; in contrast, lending the funds to subsidiaries was exempt from the ...
Working Paper , Paper 23-03

Working Paper
Net Income Measurement, Investor Inattention, and Firm Decisions

When investors have limited attention, does the way in which net income is measured matter for firm value and firms’ resource allocation decisions? This paper uses the Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2016-01, which requires public firms to incorporate changes in unrealized gains and losses (UGL) on equity securities into net income, to answer this question. We build a model with risk-averse investors who can be attentive or inattentive and managers who choose how much to invest in financial assets to maximize firms’ stock prices. The model predicts that, with inattentive investors, ...
Working Papers , Paper 22-05

Journal Article
Why bail-in? And how!

All men are created equal, but all liabilities are not. Some liabilities are more equal than others. These "financial liabilities" are products of financial firms. These products shift risk (insurance or derivatives) or provide liquidity (bank deposits or repurchase agreements). Since these liabilities have an independent value as products, they are worth more than their net present value. The value of a financial firm, then, depends on its liability structure. These special liabilities therefore affect insolvency law. Most financial firms are governed by special insolvency law; those ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue Dec , Pages 207-228

Report
The Myth of the Lead Arranger’s Share

We challenge theories that lead arrangers retain shares of syndicated loans to overcome information asymmetries. Lead arrangers frequently sell their entire loan stake—in over 50 percent of term and 70 percent of institutional loans. These selloffs usually occur days after origination, with lead arrangers retaining no other borrower exposure in 37 percent of selloff cases. Counter to theories, sold loans perform better than retained loans. Our results imply that information asymmetries could be lower than commonly assumed or mitigated by alternative mechanisms such as underwriting risk. We ...
Staff Reports , Paper 922

Working Paper
The Complexity of CEO Compensation

I study firm characteristics that justify the use of options or refresher grants in the optimal compensation packages for CEOs in the presence of moral hazard. I model explicitly the determination of stock prices as a function of the output realizations of the firm: Symmetric learning by all parties about the exogenous quality of the firm makes stock prices sensitive to output observations. Compensation packages are designed to transform this sensitivity of prices-to-output into the sensitivity of consumption-to-output that is dictated by the optimal contract. Heterogeneity in the structure ...
Working Paper , Paper 14-16

Working Paper
Tying loan interest rates to borrowers' CDS spreads

We investigate how the introduction of market-based pricing, the practice of tying loan interest rates to credit default swaps, has affected borrowing costs. We find that CDS-based loans are associated with lower interest rates, both at origination and during the life of the loan. Our results also indicate that banks simplify the covenant structure of market-based pricing loans, suggesting that the decline in the cost of bank debt is explained, at least in part, by a reduction in monitoring costs. Market-based pricing, therefore, besides reducing the cost of bank debt, may also have adverse ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2014-70

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Haque, Sharjil M. 10 items

Kleymenova, Anya V. 8 items

Lee, Seung Jung 3 items

Stebunovs, Viktors 3 items

Sun, Bo 3 items

Yang, Jie 3 items

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