Search Results

(refine search)

SORT BY: PREVIOUS / NEXT

All:
Title:
Author:
Abstract:
Keywords:

+ Add Search Parameter

Working Paper
Investment and Bilateral Insurance
Espino, Emilio; Sanchez, Juan M.; Kozlowski, Julian (2013-01-02)
Private information may limit insurance possibilities when two agents get together to pool idiosyncratic risk. However, if there is capital accumulation, bilateral insurance possibilities may improve because misreporting distorts investment. We show that if one of the Pareto weights is sufficiently large, that agent does not have incentives to misreport. This implies that, under some conditions, the full information allocation is incentive compatible when agents have equal Pareto weights. In the long run, either one of the agents goes to immiseration, or both agents’ lifetime utilities are ...
Working Papers , Paper 2013-001

Working Paper
Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation
Serfes, Konstantinos; Hunt, Robert M.; Hong, Suting (2018-11-07)
We construct a two-period model of revolving credit with asymmetric information and adverse selection.In the second period, lenders exploit an informational advantage with respect to their own customers. Those rents stimulate competition for customers in the first period. The informational advantage the current lender enjoys relative to its competitors determines interest rates, credit supply, and switching behavior. We evaluate the consequences of limiting the repricing of existing balances as implemented by recent legislation. Such restrictions increase deadweight losses and reduce ex ante ...
Working Papers , Paper 18-23

Working Paper
Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias: The Role of Concavity
Tanner, Noam (2018-03-30)
A principal is uncertain of an agent's preferences and cannot provide monetary transfers. The principal, however, does control the discretion granted to the agent. In this paper, we provide a simple characterization of when it is optimal for the principal to screen by offering different terms of discretion to the agent. When the principal's utility is sufficiently concave, it is optimal for the principal to pool and to offer all agents the same discretion. Thus, for any number of agents and any distribution over agent preferences, the optimal contract is simple: the principal sets a cap and ...
Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers , Paper RPA 18-1

Journal Article
Stylized Facts on the Organization of Small Business Partnerships
Espino, Emilio; Sanchez, Juan M.; Kozlowski, Julian (2016)
The authors study the internal organization of small business partnerships and focus on the number of owners and ownership structure and the dynamics of these variables. They find that partnerships tend to have a small number of owners with equal distribution of ownership shares. Moreover, while partnerships with equally distributed shares tend to keep this distribution constant, those with unequally distributed shares tend to move toward more equal distribution over time. The authors highlight that these facts are in line with the theory of private information in small business partnerships ...
Review , Volume 98 , Issue 4 , Pages 297-310

Working Paper
Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets
Lester, Benjamin; Venkateswaran, Venky; Shourideh, Ali; Zetlin-Jones, Ariel (2017-10-10)
We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into a standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We characterize the unique equilibrium, and use our characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. We show that the relationship between an agent?s type, the quantity he trades, and the price he pays is jointly determined by the severity of adverse selection and the concentration of market power. Therefore, quantifying the effects of adverse selection requires controlling for market ...
Working Papers , Paper 17-35

Report
Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets
Lee, Michael Junho; Martin, Antoine; Townsend, Robert M. (2024-09-01)
Trades in today’s financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1121

Working Paper
The Complexity of CEO Compensation
Jarque, Arantxa (2014-10-02)
I study firm characteristics that justify the use of options or refresher grants in the optimal compensation packages for CEOs in the presence of moral hazard. I model explicitly the determination of stock prices as a function of the output realizations of the firm: Symmetric learning by all parties about the exogenous quality of the firm makes stock prices sensitive to output observations. Compensation packages are designed to transform this sensitivity of prices-to-output into the sensitivity of consumption-to-output that is dictated by the optimal contract. Heterogeneity in the structure ...
Working Paper , Paper 14-16

Report
Financial System Architecture and Technological Vulnerability
Erol, Selman; Lee, Michael Junho (2024-09-01)
This paper presents a framework to study of technological resiliency of financial system architecture. Financial market infrastructures, or platforms, compete with services critical functions along various stages in the lifecycle of a trade, and make investments in technological resiliency to guard against attackers seeking to exploit system weaknesses. Platforms’ financial network effects attenuate competition between platforms on security. Exposure to vulnerabilities is magnified in the presence of strategic adversaries. Private provision of technological resiliency is generally ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1122

Working Paper
Screening and adverse selection in frictional markets
Lester, Benjamin; Venkateswaran, Venky; Shourideh, Ali; Zetlin-Jones, Ariel (2016-03-10)
We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We develop a methodology that allows for a sharp analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium and then use this characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. On the positive side, we show how the structure of equilibrium contracts?and, hence, the relationship between an agent?s type, the quantity he trades, and the corresponding price?is jointly determined by the severity ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-10

show more (47)

PREVIOUS / NEXT

Fed in Print

Search Results

FILTER BY year

FILTER BY Bank

FILTER BY Series

FILTER BY Content Type

FILTER BY Author

FILTER BY Jel Classification

FILTER BY Keywords