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Journal Article
Student Loans Under the Risk of Youth Unemployment
Monge-Naranjo, Alexander (2016)
While most college graduates eventually find jobs that match their qualifications, the possibility of long spells of unemployment and/or underemployment?combined with ensuing difficulties in repaying student loans?may limit and even dissuade productive investments in human capital. The author explores the optimal design of student loans when young college graduates can be unemployed and reaches three main conclusions. First, the optimal student loan program must incorporate an unemployment compensation mechanism as a key element, even if unemployment probabilities are endogenous and subject ...
Review , Volume 98 , Issue 2 , Pages 129-158

Working Paper
Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
Drozd, Lukasz A.; Serrano-Padial, Ricardo (2016-01-20)
Contract enforceability in financial markets often depends on the aggregate actions of agents. For example, high default rates in credit markets can delay legal enforcement or reduce the value of collateral, incentivizing even more defaults and potentially affecting credit supply. We develop a theory of credit provision in which enforceability of individual contracts is linked to aggregate behavior. The central element behind this link is enforcement capacity, which is endogenously determined by investments in enforcement infrastructure. Our paper sheds new light on the emergence of credit ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-1

Working Paper
Debtor Fraud in Consumer Debt Renegotiation
Mikhed, Slava; Raina, Sahil; Scholnick, Barry; Zhang, Man (2022-10-26)
We study how forcing financially distressed consumer debtors to repay a larger fraction of debt can lead them to misreport data fraudulently. Using a plausibly exogenous policy change that required debtors to increase repayment to creditors, we document that debtors manipulated data to avoid higher repayment. Consistent with deliberate fraud, data manipulators traveled farther to find more lenient insolvency professionals who, historically, approved more potentially fraudulent filings. Finally, we find that those debtors who misreported income had a lower probability of default on their debt ...
Working Papers , Paper 22-35

Working Paper
Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets
Lester, Benjamin; Venkateswaran, Venky; Shourideh, Ali; Zetlin-Jones, Ariel (2017-10-10)
We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into a standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We characterize the unique equilibrium, and use our characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. We show that the relationship between an agent?s type, the quantity he trades, and the price he pays is jointly determined by the severity of adverse selection and the concentration of market power. Therefore, quantifying the effects of adverse selection requires controlling for market ...
Working Papers , Paper 17-35

Working Paper
Managerial Compensation under Privately-Observed Hedging
Sun, Bo; Liu, Qi (2016-03)
This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer customized contracts that are closely tailored to manage specific risk and improve hedging efficiency. On the other hand, involvement in hedging may give rise to manipulation through misstatement of the value estimates. We show that the use of privately-observed hedging may actually require greater ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1160

Working Paper
Credit Enforcement Cycles
Drozd, Lukasz A.; Serrano-Padial, Ricardo (2017-08-21)
Empirical evidence suggests that widespread financial distress, by disrupting enforcement of credit contracts, can be self-propagatory and adversely affect the supply of credit. We propose a unifying theory that models the interplay between enforcement, borrower default decisions, and the provision of credit. The central tenets of our framework are the presence of capacity constrained enforcement and borrower heterogeneity. We show that, despite heterogeneity, borrowers tend to coordinate their default choices, leading to fragility and to credit rationing. Our model provides a rationale for ...
Working Papers , Paper 17-27

Report
Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets
Lee, Michael Junho; Martin, Antoine; Townsend, Robert M. (2024-09-01)
Trades in today’s financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1121

Report
Financial System Architecture and Technological Vulnerability
Erol, Selman; Lee, Michael Junho (2024-09-01)
This paper presents a framework to study of technological resiliency of financial system architecture. Financial market infrastructures, or platforms, compete with services critical functions along various stages in the lifecycle of a trade, and make investments in technological resiliency to guard against attackers seeking to exploit system weaknesses. Platforms’ financial network effects attenuate competition between platforms on security. Exposure to vulnerabilities is magnified in the presence of strategic adversaries. Private provision of technological resiliency is generally ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1122

Working Paper
The Complexity of CEO Compensation
Jarque, Arantxa (2014-10-02)
I study firm characteristics that justify the use of options or refresher grants in the optimal compensation packages for CEOs in the presence of moral hazard. I model explicitly the determination of stock prices as a function of the output realizations of the firm: Symmetric learning by all parties about the exogenous quality of the firm makes stock prices sensitive to output observations. Compensation packages are designed to transform this sensitivity of prices-to-output into the sensitivity of consumption-to-output that is dictated by the optimal contract. Heterogeneity in the structure ...
Working Paper , Paper 14-16

Working Paper
Risk Choices and Compensation Design
Sun, Bo; Carey, Mark S. (2015-01-26)
We analyze the impact of bad-tail risks on managerial pay functions, especially the decision to pay managers in stock or in options. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that options are often a superior vehicle for limiting managerial incentives to take bad-tail risks while providing incentives to exert effort. Arrangements similar to collar options are able to incent the desired project choice in wider range of circumstances than call options or stock. However, information requirements appear high. We briefly explore alternatives with features similar to maluses and clawbacks, which ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1130

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