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Jel Classification:D43 

Working Paper
Credit Misallocation and Macro Dynamics with Oligopolistic Financial Intermediaries

Bank market power shapes firm investment and financing dynamics and hence affects the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. Motivated by a secular increase in the concentration of the US banking industry, I study bank market power through the lens of a dynamic general equilibrium model with oligopolistic banks and heterogeneous firms. The lack of competition allows banks to price discriminate and charge firm-specific markups in excess of default premia. In turn, the cross-sectional dispersion of markups amplifies the impact of macroeconomic shocks. During a crisis, banks exploit their market ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP 2022-41

Working Paper
Screening and adverse selection in frictional markets

We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We develop a methodology that allows for a sharp analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium and then use this characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. On the positive side, we show how the structure of equilibrium contracts?and, hence, the relationship between an agent?s type, the quantity he trades, and the corresponding price?is jointly determined by the severity ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-10

Working Paper
Are Supply Networks Efficiently Resilient?

We show that supply networks are inefficiently, and insufficiently, resilient. Upstream firms can expand their production capacity to hedge againstsupply and demand shocks. But the social benefits of such investments arenot internalized due to market power and market incompleteness. Upstreamfirms under-invest in capacity and resilience, passing-on the costs to downstreamfirms, and drive trade excessively towards the spot markets. There isa wedge between the market solution and a constrained optimal benchmark,which persists even without rare and large shocks. Policies designed to incentivize ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2024-031

Working Paper
Capacity Choice, Monetary Trade, and the Cost of Inflation

Firms often make production decisions before meeting a buyer. We incorporate this often-overlooked fact into an otherwise standard monetary search model and show that it has important implications for the set of equilibria, efficiency, and the cost of inflation. Our model features a strategic complementarity between the buyers' ex ante choice of money balances and sellers' ex ante choice of productive capacity. When resale value of unsold inventories is high, sellers carry excess capacity and the equilibrium is unique. But, when resale value is low, there is a continuum of equilibria, all of ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-019

Working Paper
Scalable Demand and Markups

We study changes in markups across 72 product markets from 2006 to 2018. A growing literature has documented a rise in markups over time using a production function approach; we instead employ the standard microeconomic method, which is to estimate demand and then invert firms’ first-order pricing conditions to infer their markups. To make the method scalable, we propose estimating nested logit demand models, using household panel data to automate the assignment of products to nests. Our results indicate an overall upward trend in markups between 2006 and 2018, with considerable ...
Working Papers , Paper 23-15

Working Paper
Large and Small Sellers: A Theory of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Sequential Search

The paper studies equilibrium pricing in a product market for an indivisible good where buyers search for sellers. Buyers search sequentially for sellers but do not meet every seller with the same probability. Specifically, a fraction of the buyers' meetings lead to one particular large seller, while the remaining meetings lead to one of a continuum of small sellers. In this environment, the small sellers would like to set a price that makes the buyers indifferent between purchasing the good and searching for another seller. The large seller would like to price the small sellers out of the ...
Working Paper , Paper 14-8

Report
The Opportunity Costs of Entrepreneurs in International Trade

We show that a trade model with an exogenous set of heterogeneous firms with fixed operating costs has the same aggregate outcomes as a span-of-control model. Fixed costs in the heterogeneous-firm model are entrepreneurs' forgone wage in the span-of-control model.
Staff Report , Paper 533

Report
Brand Reallocation and Market Concentration

We study the interaction of customer capital and productivity through brand reallocation across firms. We develop a firm dynamics model with brands as transferable customer capital, heterogeneous firm productivity, and variable markups. We study the matching process between transferable brand capital and core productivity, which can be inefficient with significant welfare implications. We link USPTO trademark data with Nielsen sales data to study the prevalence of brand reallocation and the response of sales and prices to reallocation. Quantitatively, brand reallocation reduces welfare. ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1116

Working Paper
Self-confirming Price Dispersion in Monetary Economies

In a monetary economy, we show that price dispersion arises as an equilibrium outcome without the need for costly simultaneous search or any heterogeneity in preferences, production costs, or search technologies. A distribution of money holdings among buyers makes sellers indifferent across a set of posted prices, leading to a non-degenerate price distribution. This price distribution, in turn, makes buyers indifferent across a range of money balances, rationalizing the non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. We completely characterize the distribution of posted prices and money ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2018-046

Working Paper
Asymmetric Information and the Death of ABS CDOs

A key feature of the 2007 financial crisis is that for many securities trading had ceased; where trading did occur, market prices were well below intrinsic values, especially for ABS CDOs. One explanation is that information had been asymmetric, with sellers having better information than buyers. We first show the information advantages sellers had over buyers in both the issuance of CDOs and, through vertical integration, performance of the CDO collateral that could well have disrupted trading after the onset of the crisis. Using a ?workhorse" model for pricing securities under asymmetric ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1075

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