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Author:Calomiris, Charles W. 

Working Paper
Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal swings in loan demand was one reason for the founding of the Federal Reserve System. Existing evidence on the post-Federal Reserve increase in the seasonal volatility of aggregate lending and the decrease in seasonal interest rate swings suggests that it succeeded in that mission. Nevertheless, less than 8 percent of state-chartered banks joined the Federal Reserve in its first decade. Some have speculated that nonmembers could avoid higher costs of the Federal Reserve?s reserve requirements while still obtaining access indirectly to the ...
Working Paper , Paper 16-6

Working Paper
Credit card securitization and regulatory arbitrage

This paper explores the motivations and desirability of off-balance-sheet financing of credit card receivables by banks. We explore three related issues: the degree to which securitizations result in the transfer of risk out of the originating bank, the extent to which securitization permits banks to economize on capital by avoiding regulatory minimum capital requirements, and whether banks' avoidance of minimum capital regulation through securitization with implicit recourse has been undesirable from a regulatory standpoint. We show that this intermediation structure could be motivated ...
Working Papers , Paper 03-7

Working Paper
Leverage as a state variable for employment, inventory accumulation, and fixed investment

Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 94-24

Conference Paper
Remarks on inside information in banking

Proceedings , Paper 359

Working Paper
Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Unprotected Banks: National Banks in the 1890s

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks. Bankers may abuse their control rights to give themselves excessive salaries, favored access to credit, or to take excessive risks that benefit themselves at the expense of depositors. Banks must design contracting and governance structures that sufficiently resolve agency problems so that they can attract funding from outside shareholders and depositors. We examine banks from the 1890s, a period when there were no distortions from deposit insurance or government interventions ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2014-08

Conference Paper
Housing-finance intervention and private incentives: helping minorities and the poor


Conference Paper
Contagion and bank failures during the Great Depression: the June 1932 Chicago banking panic.

Proceedings , Paper 451

Conference Paper
Reforming the global financial system

Proceedings , Paper 644

Conference Paper
Bank capital and portfolio management: the 1930s capital crunch and scramble to shed risk

Proceedings , Paper 521

Conference Paper
Success and failure in pre-depression bank liability insurance

Proceedings , Paper 235


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