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Working Paper
Interchange Fees in Payment Networks Implications for Prices, Profits, and Welfare
This paper develops a two-sided model of the payment card market with elastic consumer demand, merchant and network market power, ad valorem interchange fees, cardholder rewards and cash as an alternative payment method. Drawing on insights from public finance, we define a credit card tax—an endogenous wedge between consumer and merchant prices generated by interchange fees, rewards, and credit card adoption. We show how this tax affects equilibrium prices, platform profits and welfare. Our analysis yields a novel and policy-relevant result: Contrary to conventional wisdom, capping ...
Working Paper
Interchange Fees in Payment Networks: Implications for Prices, Profits, and Welfare
In a two-sided model of the payment card market, we introduce a specific form of elastic demand (constant elasticity), merchant market power, ad valorem fees, and cash as an alternative. We derive the “credit card tax,” consisting of an endogenously determined interchange fee and any rewards paid. We characterize how this tax influences prices, profits, and welfare. We also examine how these relationships vary under different assumptions about the elasticity of demand, merchant market power, and differentiation between cash and credit. Under the assumptions of our model, by endogenizing ...