Search Results
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Identification and estimation of a model of hyperinflation with a continuum of \"sunspot\" equilibrium
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    This paper constructs a model with two structural equations: the Government budget constraint and a linear version of Cagan?s portfolio balance equation. The model contains a continuum of equilibria with ?sunspot equilibria.? Closed forms for the solutions are found. Even though there is a continuum of equilibria, the model is overidentified econometrically, so that the model restricts time series data on price levels and currency stocks. We describe how the free parameters of the model can be estimated, including some parameters that serve to index particular members of the continuum of ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Resolving the National Banking System note-issue puzzle
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    Under the National Banking System, 1863-1914, national banks that deposited sufficient collateral could issue notes provided they paid a tax on notes in circulation: 1 percent per year before 1900 and 1/2 percent thereafter. Because note issue was far below the allowed maximum, an arbitrage argument predicts that short-term nominal interest rates should have been bounded above by the tax rate. They were not. That is the note-issue puzzle. Our resolution takes the form of a model in which notes play a role, but in which the profitability of note issue is not tied to anything that resembles a ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent?s type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences, and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Report
                                                                                
                                            Open-market operations in a model of regulated, insured intermediaries
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    In ?The Inefficiency of Interest-Bearing National Debt,? (JPE, April 1979) we argued that private sector transaction costs are needed in order to explain interest on government debt. It follows that if the government?s transaction costs do not depend on its portfolio, then, barring special circumstances, an open-market purchase is deflationary and welfare improving. In this paper we show that this result can survive a potentially relevant special circumstance: reserve requirements which limit the size of insured intermediaries.
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Journal Article
                                                                                
                                            Resolving the national bank note paradox
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    During the 1882_1914 period, U.S. national banks could issue circulating notes backed by specified government securities. Earlier attempts to explain yields on those securities by costs of note issue discovered a paradox: yields were too high. We point out two previously ignored sources of costs: idle notes and note redemptions that were highly variable, thereby exacerbating the problem of managing reserves. We present data on idle notes and estimate, from partial data on redemptions, the uncertainty due to redemptions. We also present a semiannual time series of an upper bound on the average ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Conference Paper
                                                                                
                                            Search-theoretic models of international currency - commentary
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Journal Article
                                                                                
                                            Why the Fed should consider holding Mo constant