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Working Paper
A Distance-based Algorithm for Defining Antitrust Markets
We propose a simple algorithm for defining merger-specific geographic antitrust markets based on merging firm proximity. Applying it to over a thousand hypothetical bank mergers, we compare concentration measures in our markets to those defined by the Federal Reserve, which are not merger-specific, finding broad agreement but also offering potential improvements upon current definitions.
Working Paper
Beyond "Horizontal" and "Vertical": The Welfare Effects of Complex Integration
We study the welfare impacts of mergers in markets where some firms are already vertically integrated. Our model features logit Bertrand competition downstream and Nash Bargaining upstream. We numerically simulate four merger types: vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an unintegrated wholesaler, downstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, upstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated wholesaler and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, and integrated mergers between two integrated retailer/wholesaler pairs. We ...