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Working Paper
Updated Primer on the Forward-Looking Analysis of Risk Events (FLARE) Model: A Top-Down Stress Test Model
This is an updated technical note describes the Forward-Looking Analysis of Risk Events (FLARE) model, which is a top-down model that helps assess how well the banking system is positioned to weather exogenous macroeconomic shocks. FLARE estimates banking system capital under varying macroeconomic scenarios, time horizons, and other systemic shocks.
Working Paper
Primer on the Forward-Looking Analysis of Risk Events (FLARE) Model: A Top-Down Stress Test Model
This technical note describes the Forward-Looking Analysis of Risk Events (FLARE) model, which is a top-down model that helps assess how well the banking system is positioned to weather exogenous macroeconomic shocks. FLARE estimates banking system capital under varying macroeconomic scenarios, time horizons, and other systemic shocks.
Discussion Paper
Testing Bank Resiliency Through Time
A resilient banking system meets the demands of households and businesses for financial services during both benign and severe macroeconomic and financial conditions. Banks' ability to weather severe macroeconomic shocks, and their willingness to continue providing financial services, depends on their levels of capital, balance sheet exposures, and ability to generate earnings. This note uses the Forward-Looking Analysis of Risk Events (FLARE) stress testing model to evaluate the resiliency of the banking system by consistently applying severe macroeconomic and financial shocks each quarter ...
Working Paper
Pricing Tail Risks: Bank Equity Returns During the 2023 Bank Stress
Did bank equity prices reflect growing sector imbalances before the 2023 failure of Silicon Valley Bank? We find that banks with higher reliance on uninsured deposits, or with higher marked-to-market leverage, had lower equity returns prior to SVB's collapse. Although markets priced uninsured deposits and high leverage individually, their interaction was not reflected in market prices prior to SVB’s failure. Post-SVB, banks with less ability to meet outflows without severely depleting capital, and banks with too little useable liquidity relative to runnable funding, experienced larger stock ...
Working Paper
Un-used Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply Shocks at SMEs during the Pandemic
Did banks curb lending to creditworthy small and mid-sized enterprises (SME) during the COVID-19 pandemic? Sitting on top of minimum capital requirements, regulatory capital buffers introduced after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) are costly regions of "rainy day" equity capital designed to absorb losses and provide lending capacity in a downturn. Using a novel set of confidential loan level data that includes private SME firms, we show that "buffer-constrained" banks (those entering the pandemic with capital ratios close to this regulatory buffer region) reduced loan commitments to ...
Discussion Paper
The interaction of bank leverage, interest-rate risk, and runnable funding
Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Signature Bank, First Republic Bank (FRC) had too little useable liquidity relative to their runnable funding and too little capital given the magnitude of their interest rate risk. The mismanagement of these vulnerabilities ultimately contributed to a loss of confidence in their business models.