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                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            When does the prime rate change?
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Conference Paper
                                                                                
                                            The effects of focus and diversification on bank risk and return: evidence from individual bank loan portfolios
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    We study empirically the effect of focus (specialization) vs. diversification on the return and the risk of banks using data from 105 Italian banks over the period 1993?1999. Specifically, we analyze the tradeoffs between (loan portfolio) focus and diversification using a unique data set that is able to identify individual bank loan exposures to different industries, to different sectors, and to different geographical regions. Our results are consistent with a theory that predicts a deterioration in bank monitoring quality at high levels of risk and a deterioration in bank monitoring quality ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Report
                                                                                
                                            The Myth of the Lead Arranger’s Share
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    We challenge theories that lead arrangers retain shares of syndicated loans to overcome information asymmetries. Lead arrangers frequently sell their entire loan stake—in over 50 percent of term and 70 percent of institutional loans. These selloffs usually occur days after origination, with lead arrangers retaining no other borrower exposure in 37 percent of selloff cases. Counter to theories, sold loans perform better than retained loans. Our results imply that information asymmetries could be lower than commonly assumed or mitigated by alternative mechanisms such as underwriting risk. We ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            The hedging performance of ECU futures contracts
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Bank equity stakes in borrowing firms and financial distress
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    The authors derive optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude with a healthy firm's owners to seek unnecessary concessions or to collude with a distressed firm's owners to claim that the firm is healthy. To prove that a request for concessions has not come from a healthy firm/bank coalition, the bank must hold either a very small or a very large equity stake when ...