Discussion Paper
Federal fiscal constitutions part 1: risk sharing and moral hazard
Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido (1992)
Inspired by the current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative constitutional arrangements in a federation of countries. There are two levels of government: local and federal. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of aggregate shocks, while federal policy shares international risk. Policies are chosen under majority rule. There is a moral hazard problem: federal risk-sharing can induce the local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. We investigate this incentive problem under alternative fiscal ...
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics , Paper 72

Discussion Paper
Politics and economic policy
Persson, Torsten (1992)
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics , Paper 62

Discussion Paper
The Swedish business cycle: stylized facts over 130 years
Soderlind, Paul; Persson, Torsten; Hassler, John; Lundvik, Petter (1992)
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics , Paper 63