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Author:Mehran, Hamid 

Journal Article
The effect of employee stock options on the evolution of compensation in the 1990s

Between 1995 and 1998, actual growth in compensation per hour (CPH) accelerated from approximately 2 percent to 5 percent. Yet as the labor market continued to tighten in 1999, CPH growth unexpectedly slowed. This article explores whether this aggregate "wage puzzle" can be explained by changes in the pay structure?specifically, by the increased use of employee stock options in the 1990s. The CPH measure captures these options on their exercise date, rather than on the date they are granted. By recalculating compensation per hour to reflect the options' value on the grant date, the ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue Dec , Pages 17-34

Report
The effect of state pension cut legislation on bank values

This study provides an empirical analysis of the impact of Wisconsin and Ohio pension cut legislation on values of banks operating in Wisconsin and Ohio, banks operating in other states in which pension cut legislation was being considered as Wisconsin and Ohio went through its legislative process, and all publicly traded U.S. banks. We find that banks doing business in Wisconsin and Ohio experience positive (negative) stock price reactions to announcements that indicate an increased (a decreased) probability of pension cut legislation. The stock price reactions are positively related to the ...
Staff Reports , Paper 679

Journal Article
Introduction and appendix to Behavioral Risk Management in the Financial Services Industry: The Role of Culture, Governance, and Financial Reporting

This volume, four years in the making, includes nine research papers that aim to identify and understand the key factors affecting governance and culture in the banking industry. The volume is divided into two complementary parts. Part I introduces the concept of culture and its importance to risk management and financial stability. The articles present a framework for diagnosing and changing culture, describe how corporate culture is shaped, explore the importance of effective risk management, and examine the roles of deferred cash compensation and bank cash holdings in promoting financial ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue Aug , Pages 1-2

Working Paper
Regulatory incentives and consolidation: the case of commercial bank mergers and the Community Reinvestment Act

Bank regulators are required to consider a bank?s record of providing credit to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals in approving bank applications for mergers and acquisitions. We test the hypothesis that banks strategically prepare for the regulatory and public scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition by increasing their lending to low-and moderate-income individuals in anticipation of acquiring another institution. We find evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In particular, we show that the higher the percentage of the institution?s mortgage originations in a ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-02-06

Conference Paper
Board structure, banking firm performance and the bank holding company organizational form

Proceedings , Paper 866

Report
The effect of employee stock options on bank investment choice, borrowing, and capital

In this paper, we test the hypothesis that granting employee stock options motivates CEOs of banking firms to undertake riskier projects. We also investigate whether granting employee stock options reduces the bank's incentive to borrow while inducing a buildup of regulatory capital. Using a sample of 549 bank-years for publicly traded banks from 1992 to 2002, we find some evidence that the bank's equity volatility (total as well as residual) and asset volatility increase as CEO stock option holdings increase. In addition, it appears that granting employee stock options motivates banks to ...
Staff Reports , Paper 305

Report
Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks? unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived from this framework: that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation (1) decreases with the total leverage ratio and (2) increases with the intensity of monitoring provided by regulators and nondepository (subordinated) debtholders. We construct an index of the intensity of outsider ...
Staff Reports , Paper 308

Report
The impact of tax law changes on bank dividend policy, sell-offs, organizational form, and industry structure

This paper investigates the effect at the bank and industry level of a 1996 tax law change allowing commercial banks to elect S-corporation status. By the end of 2007, roughly one in three commercial banks had either opted for or converted to the S-corporation form of organization. Our study analyzes the effect of this conversion on bank dividend payouts. It also examines the effect S-corporation status has on a community bank's likelihood of sell-off and measures a firm's sensitivity to tax rates based on its choice of organizational form. We document that dividend payouts increase ...
Staff Reports , Paper 369

Report
Executive compensation and risk taking

This paper studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A theoretical model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive suggests that 1) in principle, excessive risk taking (in the form of risk shifting) may be addressed by basing compensation on both stock price and the price of debt (proxied by the credit default swap spread), but 2) shareholders may be unable to commit to designing compensation contracts in this way and indeed may not want to because of distortions introduced by either deposit insurance or naive ...
Staff Reports , Paper 456

Report
Corporate governance and banks: what have we learned from the financial crisis?

Recent academic work and policy analysis give insight into the governance problems exposed by the financial crisis and suggest possible solutions. We begin this paper by explaining why governance of banks differs from governance of nonfinancial firms. We then look at four areas of governance: executive compensation, boards, risk management, and market discipline. We discuss promising solutions and areas where further research is needed.
Staff Reports , Paper 502

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