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Working Paper
A theory of political cycles
We study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances. Policymakers' equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election. Typically, incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election (for a given reputation level), as argued in the political cycles literature, and these political cycles are less important when the policymaker's reputation is better. Our analysis sheds light on other agency relationships in which ...
Journal Article
Legal protection to foreign investors
Foreign investment is typically considered an important source of growth for developing countries. This article describes the legal protection granted to foreign investors and its enforcement mechanisms. Governments have signed international investment agreements intended to protect foreign investors from the risk of expropriation and have increasingly chosen to issue sovereign debt in international financial centers, which expose defaulting governments to litigations in foreign national courts. In most cases, governments have complied with unfavorable rulings of international arbitration ...
Working Paper
On the cyclicality of the interest rate in emerging economy models: solution methods matter
We study the sovereign default model that has been used to account for the cyclical behavior of interest rates in emerging market economies. This model is often solved using the discrete state space technique with evenly spaced grid points. We show that this method necessitates a large number of grid points to avoid generating spurious interest rate movements. This makes the discrete state technique significantly more inefficient than using Chebyshev polynomials or cubic spline interpolation to approximate the value functions. We show that the inefficiency of the discrete state space ...
Working Paper
Debt dilution and sovereign default risk
We measure the effects of debt dilution on sovereign default risk and show how these effects can be mitigated with debt contracts promising borrowing-contingent payments. First, we calibrate a baseline model la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) to match features of the data. In this model, bonds' values can be diluted. Second, we present a model in which sovereign bonds contain a covenant promising that after each time the government borrows it pays to the holder of each bond issued in previous periods the difference between the bond market price that would have been observed absent current-period ...
Working Paper
Reputation, career concerns, and job assignments
Does a worker who had a successful career have stronger or weaker incentives to manipulate his reputation than a worker who performed poorly? This paper presents a tractable model that allows us to study career concerns when the strength of a worker?s incentives depends on his employment history (the history of his past actions, jobs, and performances). More specifically, the paper incorporates standard job assignments into the main model in Holmstrom?s (1999) seminal paper on career concerns. Equilibrium wages, equilibrium job assignments, and the strength of career-concern incentives are ...
Working Paper
Heterogeneous borrowers in quantitative models of sovereign default
We extend the model used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default, allowing policymakers of different types to alternate in power. We show that a default episode may be triggered by a change in the type of policymaker in office, and that such a default is likely to occur only if there is enough political stability and if policymakers encounter poor economic conditions. Under high political stability, political turnover enables the model to generate a weaker correlation between economic conditions and default decisions, a higher and more volatile spread, and lower borrowing levels ...
Journal Article
Why could political incentives be different during election times?
Why could political incentives be different during election times? This article provides answers to this question using a career-concern model of political cycles. The analysis in the article is also relevant to understanding other agency relationships in which an important part of compensation is decided on infrequently.
Working Paper
Mortgage defaults
We incorporate house price risk and mortgages into a standard incomplete market (SIM) model. We calibrate the model to match U.S. data, and we show that the model also accounts for non-targeted features of the data such as the distribution of down payments, the life-cycle prole of homeownership, and the mortgage default rate. In addition, we show that the average coefficients that measure the agents' ability to self-insure against income shocks are similar to those of a SIM model without housing (as presented by Kaplan and Violante, 2010). However, incorporating housing increases the values ...
Working Paper
International Reserves and Rollover Risk
We study the optimal accumulation of international reserves in a quantitative model of sovereign default with long-term debt and a risk-free asset. Keeping higher levels of reserves provides a hedge against rollover risk, but this is costly because using reserves to pay down debt allows the government to reduce sovereign spreads. Our model, parameterized to mimic salient features of a typical emerging economy, can account for a significant fraction of the holdings of international reserves, and the larger accumulation of both debt and reserves in periods of low spreads and high income. We ...