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A model of the federal funds market: yesterday, today, and tomorrow
The landscape of the federal funds market changed drastically in the wake of the Great Recession as large-scale asset purchase programs left depository institutions awash with reserves and new regulations made it more costly for these institutions to lend. As traditional levers for implementing monetary policy became less effective, the Federal Reserve introduced new tools to implement the target range for the federal funds rate, changing this landscape even more. In this paper, we develop a model that is capable of reproducing the main features of the federal funds market, as observed before ...
Working Paper
A Model of the Federal Funds Market: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
The landscape of the federal funds market changed drastically in the wake of the Great Recession as large-scale asset purchase programs left depository institutions awash with reserves, and new regulations made it more costly for these institutions to lend. As traditional levers for implementing monetary policy became less effective, the Federal Reserve introduced new tools to implement the target range for the federal funds rate, changing this landscape even more. In this paper, we develop a model that is capable of reproducing the main features of the federal funds market, as observed ...
Working Paper
Excess Reserves and Monetary Policy Implementation
In response to the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve resorted to several unconventional policies that drastically altered the landscape of the federal funds market. The current environment, in which depository institutions are flush with excess reserves, has forced policymakers to design a new operational framework for monetary policy implementation. We provide a parsimonious model that captures the key features of the current federal funds market along with the instruments introduced by the Federal Reserve to implement its target for the federal funds rate. We use this model to analyze ...
Journal Article
Breaking the ice: government interventions in frozen markets
When subprime mortgage defaults started mounting in 2007, financial institutions found themselves unable to profitably sell off these soured investments or raise new equity. As these institutions struggled to reduce their leverage, consumers and firms alike found it increasingly difficult to borrow, which helped trigger a deep recession. Within the context of two popular explanations for the freeze ? asymmetric information and debt overhang ? Benjamin Lester discusses the costs and benefits of policies aimed at thawing markets in a crisis, including direct asset purchases, equity injections, ...
Working Paper
Competing with asking prices
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a variety of real world markets, asking prices have received little attention in the academic literature. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that using an asking price is optimal: it is the ...
Working Paper
Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset Markets
We study a search and bargaining model of asset markets in which investors? heterogeneous valuations for the asset are drawn from an arbitrary distribution. We present a solution technique that makes the model fully tractable, and allows us to provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium, in closed form, both in and out of steady state. Using this characterization, we derive several novel implications that highlight the importance of heterogeneity. In particular, we show how some investors endogenously emerge as intermediaries, even though they have no advantage in contacting ...
Working Paper
Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we allow for a general meeting technology and show that its properties crucially affect the mechanism that sellers select in equilibrium. In general, it is optimal for sellers to post an auction without a reserve price but with a fee, paid by all buyers who meet with the seller. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call invariance, and show that meeting fees are equal to zero if and only if this condition is satisfied. Finally, we discuss how invariance is related to other properties of meeting ...
Working Paper
The Heterogeneous Impact of Referrals on Labor Market Outcomes
We document a new set of facts regarding the impact of referrals on labor market outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between different types of referrals—those from family and friends and those from business contacts—and different occupations. Then we develop an on-the-job search model that incorporates referrals and calibrate the model to key moments in the data. The calibrated model yields new insights into the roles played by different types of referrals in the match formation process and provides quantitative estimates of the effects of referrals on ...
Journal Article
Implementing Monetary Policy in a Changing Federal Funds Market
As the Fed normalizes its balance sheet, it helps to understand how the federal funds market used to operate, how it changed in the wake of the crisis, and what comes next.
Working Paper
Screening and adverse selection in frictional markets
We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We develop a methodology that allows for a sharp analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium and then use this characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. On the positive side, we show how the structure of equilibrium contracts?and, hence, the relationship between an agent?s type, the quantity he trades, and the corresponding price?is jointly determined by the severity ...