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Working Paper
Heterogeneous Districts, Interests, and Trade Policy
Congressional districts are political entities with heterogeneous trade policy preferences due to their diverse economic structures. Representation of these interests in Congress is a crucial aspect of trade policymaking that is missing in canonical political economy models of trade. In this paper, we underscore the influence of districts by developing a political economy model of trade with region-specific factors. Using 2002 data from U.S. Congressional Districts, we first characterize the unobserved district-level demand for protection. Extending the model beyond the small country ...
Working Paper
District Heterogeneity, Legislative Bargaining, and Trade Policy
The diverse economic structures of Congressional Districts generate heterogeneous trade policy preferences. The crucial role of these district-level interests in determining trade policy in Congress is largely absent from canonical political economy models of trade (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994). We address this gap by modeling the aggregation of district preferences into national trade policy through legislative bargaining. This supply-side explanation of trade policy builds on the legislative bargaining framework of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2013). The ...