Report
Open-market operations in a model of regulated, insured intermediaries
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1978)
In ?The Inefficiency of Interest-Bearing National Debt,? (JPE, April 1979) we argued that private sector transaction costs are needed in order to explain interest on government debt. It follows that if the government?s transaction costs do not depend on its portfolio, then, barring special circumstances, an open-market purchase is deflationary and welfare improving. In this paper we show that this result can survive a potentially relevant special circumstance: reserve requirements which limit the size of insured intermediaries.
Staff Report , Paper 34

Report
A general method of solution for game theory and its relevance for economic theorizing
Bryant, John (1980)
According to the folklore of economics, game theory has failed. This paper argues that that is an incorrect interpretation of the game theory literature. When faced with a well-posed problem, game theory provides a solution. When faced with an ill-posed problem, game theory fails to provide a solution. This is, indeed, the best one can hope for from a method of analysis! Further, some suggestions are made for facing game theory with well-posed economic problems.
Staff Report , Paper 54

Report
Shocks, learning, and persistence
Bryant, John (1980)
A simple model of the process of learning in a diverse economy is presented. This model produces a stylized business cycle with shocks which precipitate the learning process. All agents have the same information, which implies that this business cycle cannot be reduced by improved information flow, counter to many models of output and employment fluctuation.
Staff Report , Paper 50

Report
Price setting 'perfect competitors'
Bryant, John (1977)
Staff Report , Paper 29

Report
A suggestion for further simplifying the theory of money
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1980)
Our suggestion consists of three postulates: assets are valued only in terms of their payoffs, perfect foresight, and complete and costless markets under laissez-faire. Together these postulates imply that the crucial anomaly, rate-of-return dominance of ?money,? is to be explained by legal restrictions. ; Our defense of these postulates is two-fold. First we compare them with existing alternative theories. Second, we provide an illustrative model which : (a) is consistent with the postulates, (b) implies rate-of-return dominance under suitable legal restrictions, and (c) addresses monetary ...
Staff Report , Paper 62

Report
The inefficiency of a nominal national debt
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1977)
Staff Report , Paper 28

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Demand management: an illustrative example
Bryant, John (1979)
This paper presents a simple coherent general equilibrium example in which optimal provision of a public good implies counter-cyclical government expenditure.
Staff Report , Paper 46

Report
Approximately complete markets: a generalization of the states of the world model
Bryant, John (1978)
Staff Report , Paper 33

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A price discrimination analysis of monetary policy
Wallace, Neil; Bryant, John (1983)
Monetary policy is analyzed within a model that ignores transaction costs and appeals solely to legal restrictions on private intermediation to explain the coexistence of currency and interest-bearing default-free bonds. The interaction between such legal restrictions and monetary policy is illustrated in versions of overlapping generations models that contain three assets: government-issued currency and bonds and real capital. It is shown that legal restrictions and the use of both currency and bonds permit the government to levy a discriminatory inflation tax and that such a tax may be ...
Staff Report , Paper 51

Report
Costly information and the stock market
Bryant, John (1980)
In a simple, coherent, general equilibrium model it is demonstrated why stock market prices do not reflect costly but socially useless information.
Staff Report , Paper 53