Working Paper
Risk aversion, risk sharing, and joint bidding: a study of outer continental shelf petroleum auctions
Abstract: The bidding decision by firms in OCS petroleum auctions is modeled as an application of the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion. This theory is apt since OCS leases are innately risky investments: during 1954-1969, 77 percent of the Gulf of Mexico leases were unprofitable, while the average bonus (price) was $2,228,000. The model of the simultaneous choices of bid level, share in joint bids, and bids on other tracts in the same auction is tested on 17 auctions during 1968-1975. Empirical results support the hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion and the risk-pooling explanation of joint bidding.
Status: Published in Land Economics, November 1985, 61(4), pp. 372-86
Access Documents
File(s): File format is application/pdf http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/1985/1985-014.pdf
Authors
Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Part of Series: Working Papers
Publication Date: 1985
Number: 1985-014