Working Paper

Shadow Insurance? Money Market Fund Investors and Bank Sponsorship

Abstract: We argue that bank holding companies (BHCs) extend shadow insurance to the prime institutional money market funds (PI-MMFs) they sponsor and that PI-MMFs price this shadow insurance by charging investors significantly higher expense ratios and paying lower net yields. We provide evidence that after September 2008, expense ratios at BHC-sponsored PI-MMFs increased more than at non-BHC-sponsored PI-MMFs. Despite higher expense ratios, BHC-sponsored PI-MMFs did not experience larger redemptions than non-BHC-sponsored PI-MMFs. In addition, we show that expenses ratios increased with BHCs’ financial strength and the likelihood of their support; however, this expense ratio differential disappeared after the 2016 MMF reform.

Keywords: Bank Holding Company; Financial Crisis; money market funds; Banks and banking; Bank Run;

JEL Classification: G20; G21; G23; G28; H12; H81;

https://doi.org/10.18651/RWP2021-07

Bibliographic Information

Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Part of Series: Research Working Paper

Publication Date: 2021-08-27

Number: RWP 21-07