Working Paper

The economics of two-sided payment card markets: pricing, adoption and usage

Abstract: This paper provides a new theory for two-sided payment card markets by positing better microfoundations. Adopting payment cards by consumers and merchants requires a fixed cost, but yields lower marginal costs of making payments. Considering this together with the heterogeneity of consumer income and merchant size, our theory derives card adoption and usage pattern consistent with cross-section and time-series evidence. Our analyses also help explain the observed card pricing pattern, particularly the rising merchant (interchange) fees over time. This is because a private card network, besides internalizing the two-sided market externality, has the incentive to inflate the card transaction value. We show that privately determined card pricing, adoption and usage tend to deviate from the social optimum, and imposing a ceiling on interchange fees may improve consumer welfare. ; Also issued as a Payments System Research Working Paper.

Bibliographic Information

Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Part of Series: Research Working Paper

Publication Date: 2008

Number: RWP 08-12