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Jel Classification:E60 

Report
On the Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria with Pandemics

The epidemiological literature suggests that virus transmission occurs only when individuals are in relatively close contact. We show that if society can control the extent to which economic agents are exposed to the virus and agents can commit to contracts, virus externalities are local, and competitive equilibria are efficient. The Second Welfare Theorem also holds. These results still apply when infection status is imperfectly observed and when agents are privately informed about their infection status. If society cannot control virus exposure, then virus externalities are global and ...
Staff Report , Paper 644

Working Paper
State-Dependent Local Projections

Do state-dependent local projections asymptotically recover the population responses of macroeconomic aggregates to structural shocks? The answer to this question depends on how the state of the economy is determined and on the magnitude of the shocks. When the state is exogenous, the local projection estimator recovers the population response regardless of the shock size. When the state depends on macroeconomic shocks, as is common in empirical work, local projections only recover the conditional response to an infinitesimal shock, but not the responses to larger shocks of interest in many ...
Working Papers , Paper 2302

Working Paper
Foreign competition and banking industry dynamics: an application to Mexico

The authors develop a simple general equilibrium framework to study the effects of global competition on banking industry dynamics and welfare. They apply the framework to the Mexican banking industry, which underwent a major structural change in the 1990s as a consequence of both government policy and external shocks. Given the high concentration in the Mexican banking industry, domestic and foreign banks act strategically in the authors? framework. After calibrating the model to Mexican data, the authors examine the welfare consequences of government policies that promote global ...
Working Papers , Paper 15-33

Working Paper
Considerations regarding the use of the discount window to support economic activity through a funding for lending program

This paper considers the use of the Federal Reserve's ability to provide loans to depository institutions under its discount window lending authority in support of achieving its monetary policy objectives through a funding for lending program. Broadly, a funding for lending program could be structured as one in which the Federal Reserve makes ample low-cost funding available to banks or a program in which the Federal Reserve only provides low-cost funding conditional on the banks meeting certain lending targets. We provide a general description of how a funding for lending program could be ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2022-070

Working Paper
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program

The main rationale for policy intervention in debt renegotiation is to enhance such activity when foreclosures are perceived to be inefficiently high. We examine the ability of the government to influence debt renegotiation by empirically evaluating the effects of the 2009 Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) that provided intermediaries (servicers) with sizeable financial incentives to renegotiate mortgages. A difference-in-difference strategy that exploits variation in program eligibility criteria reveals that the program generated an overall increase in the intensity of ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2013-27

Working Paper
The political economy of endogenous taxation and redistribution

This paper examines a simple dynamic model in which agents vote over capital income taxation and redistributive transfers. We show that in equilibrium the typical agent's preferences over the tax rate are single-peaked and derive a closed-form solution for the majority-rule tax rate. We also show that high levels of initial wealth inequality can place the economy on the 'wrong side of the Laffer curve'.
Working Papers , Paper 9704

Working Paper
Policy regime change against chronic deflation? Policy option under a long-term liquidity trap

This paper evaluates the role of the first arrow of Abenomics in guiding public perceptions on monetary policy stance through the management of expectations. In order to end chronic deflation, a policy regime change must be perceived by economic agents. Analysis using the QUICK survey system (QSS) monthly survey data shows that the reaction of monetary policy to inflation has been declining since the mid 2000s, implying intensified forward guidance well before Abenomics. However, Japan seems to have moved closer to a long-term liquidity trap, where even long-term bond yields are constrained ...
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 233

Working Paper
Evergreening

We develop a simple model of relationship lending where lenders have incentives for evergreening loans by offering better terms to less productive and more indebted firms. We detect such lending behavior using loan-level supervisory data for the United States. Low-capitalized banks systematically distort firms’ risk assessments to window-dress their balance sheets. To avoid further reductions in their capital ratios, such banks extend relatively more credit to underreported borrowers. We incorporate the theoretical mechanism into a dynamic heterogeneous-firm model to show that evergreening ...
Working Papers , Paper 2021-012

Working Paper
Evergreening

We develop a simple model of relationship lending where lenders have incentives for evergreening loans by offering better terms to firms that are close to default. We detect such lending behavior using loan-level supervisory data for the United States. Banks that own a larger share of a firm's debt provide distressed firms with relatively more credit at lower interest rates. Building on this empirical validation, we incorporate the theoretical mechanism into a dynamic heterogeneous-firm model to show that evergreening affects aggregate outcomes, resulting in lower interest rates, higher ...
Working Papers , Paper 2021-012

Working Paper
Evergreening

We develop a simple model of relationship lending where lenders have incentives for evergreening loans by offering better terms to firms that are close to default. We detect such lending behavior using loan-level supervisory data for the United States. Banks that own a larger share of a firm's debt provide distressed firms with relatively more credit at lower interest rates. Building on this empirical validation, we incorporate the theoretical mechanism into a dynamic heterogeneous-firm model to show that evergreening affects aggregate outcomes, resulting in lower interest rates, higher ...
Working Papers , Paper 2021-012

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Paul, Pascal 10 items

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Chari, V. V. 7 items

Zarutskie, Rebecca 7 items

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