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Author:Keeley, Michael C. 

Journal Article
The regulation of bank entry

Economic Review , Issue Sum , Pages 5-13

Working Paper
Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking

A fixed-rate deposit insurance system provides a moral hazard for excessive risk taking and is not viable absent regulation. Although the deposit insurance system appears to have worked remarkably well over most of its 50-year history, major problems began to appear in the early 1980s. This paper addresses the puzzle of why major problems began to arise in the early 1980s and not sooner. ; The hypothesis is that increases in competition caused bank charter values to decline, which, in turn, caused banks to- increase default risk through increases. in asset risk and reductions in capital. This ...
Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory , Paper 88-07

Journal Article
Interest checking and M1

FRBSF Economic Letter

Journal Article
Unemployment vs. employment

FRBSF Economic Letter

Journal Article
States take the lead

FRBSF Economic Letter

Journal Article
Subordinated debt as bank capital

FRBSF Economic Letter

Journal Article
Competition for money market deposit accounts

Economic Review , Issue Spr , Pages 5-27

Journal Article
Bank regulation and the public interest

Economic Review , Issue Spr , Pages 55-71

Journal Article
Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: a note (reprinted from Journal of Banking and Finance)

Economic Review , Issue Sum , Pages 34-39

Conference Paper
Competition for MMDAs

Proceedings , Paper 97

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