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Jel Classification:L13 

Working Paper
Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics

This paper develops an econometric model of industry dynamics for concentrated markets that can be estimated very quickly from market-level panel data on the number of producers and consumers using a nested fixed-point algorithm. We show that the model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium that can be calculated from the fixed points of a finite sequence of low-dimensional contraction mappings. Our nested fixed point procedure extends Rust's (1987) to account for the observable implications of mixed strategies on survival. We illustrate the model's empirical ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2013-20

Working Paper
Beyond "Horizontal" and "Vertical": The Welfare Effects of Complex Integration

We study the welfare impacts of mergers in markets where some firms are already vertically integrated. Our model features logit Bertrand competition downstream and Nash Bargaining upstream. We numerically simulate four merger types: vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an unintegrated wholesaler, downstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, upstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated wholesaler and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, and integrated mergers between two integrated retailer/wholesaler pairs. We ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2023-005

Working Paper
Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets

We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into a standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We characterize the unique equilibrium, and use our characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. We show that the relationship between an agent?s type, the quantity he trades, and the price he pays is jointly determined by the severity of adverse selection and the concentration of market power. Therefore, quantifying the effects of adverse selection requires controlling for market ...
Working Papers , Paper 17-35

Working Paper
Entry, exit, and the determinants of market structure

This paper estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and uses it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all found to be important determinants of long-run firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. Estimates for the dentist industry allow the entry cost to differ for geographic markets that were designated as Health ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2013-10

Working Paper
The Rise of Nonbanks and the Quality of Financial Services: Evidence from Consumer Complaints

We show that as nonbanks' market share increases in a local residential mortgage market, the quality of mortgage services in the market improves. Two instrumental variable analyses exploiting (1) stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve, and (2) mortgage industry surety bonds required by each state confirm this finding. We find evidence that as nonbanks grow their market share, they develop a specialty in servicing lower-income borrowers and increase investment in technology, leading to improved service quality. This improvement in service quality is more salient in counties with a ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2022-059

Working Paper
The Role of Regulation and Bank Competition in Small Firm Financing: Evidence from the Community Reinvestment Act

This paper analyzes how bank regulation that promotes greater access to credit impacts the financing of targeted small firms. It develops a model where banks compete with trade creditors to fund small firms and applies it to study the effects of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The empirical tests reveal that a CRA-induced increase in bank loans reduces small firms’ use of relatively expensive trade credit. The effect is more profound in low- and medium-income areas where financial constraints are tighter due to low bank competition. The effect is also larger for small firms that ...
Working Papers , Paper 22-06

Working Paper
Market Integration and Bank Risk-Taking

Using a workhorse model of bank competition and risk-taking, we show that increased competition from market integration affects bank risk-taking in ways beyond a simple increase in the number of competitor banks. Research has shown that increased competition in the form of an increase in the number of competitor banks can reduce risk-taking—the bank-competitor effect. Market integration not only increases the number of banks, but also the number of potential customers (depositors and borrowers) available to each bank. Increases in the potential customer base induces banks to behave more ...
Research Working Paper , Paper RWP 20-21

Working Paper
Screening and adverse selection in frictional markets

We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We develop a methodology that allows for a sharp analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium and then use this characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. On the positive side, we show how the structure of equilibrium contracts?and, hence, the relationship between an agent?s type, the quantity he trades, and the corresponding price?is jointly determined by the severity ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-10

Working Paper
Beyond "Horizontal" and "Vertical": The Welfare Effects of Complex Integration

We study the welfare impacts of mergers in markets where some firms are already vertically integrated. Our model features logit Bertrand competition downstream and Nash Bargaining upstream. We numerically simulate four merger types: vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an unintegrated wholesaler, downstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, upstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated wholesaler and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, and integrated mergers between two integrated retailer/wholesaler pairs. We ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2023-005

Working Paper
New Estimates of the Lerner Index of Market Power for U.S. Banks

The Lerner index is widely used to assess firms' market power. However, estimation and interpretation present several challenges, especially for banks, which tend to produce multiple outputs and operate with considerable inefficiency. We estimate Lerner indices for U.S. banks for 2001-18 using nonparametric estimators of the underlying cost and profit functions, controlling for inefficiency, and incorporating banks' off-balance-sheet activities. We find that mis-specification of cost or profit functional forms can seriously bias Lerner index estimates, as can failure to account for ...
Working Papers , Paper 2019-012

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