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Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Richmond Fed Economic Brief
Systemic risk regulation and the "too big to fail" problem
Borys Grochulski
Stephen Slivinski
Abstract

A single regulator tasked with preventing threats to systemic stability would need to have considerable power and discretion. But creating such a powerful entity could reinforce the moral hazard problem resulting from the idea that some firms are too big to fail.


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Borys Grochulski & Stephen Slivinski, "Systemic risk regulation and the "too big to fail" problem" , Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Richmond Fed Economic Brief, issue Jul, 2009.
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Keywords: Risk ; Financial institutions
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