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Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Working Papers
Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation
Suting Hong
Robert M. Hunt
Konstantinos Serfes

We construct a two-period model of revolving credit with asymmetric information and adverse selection.In the second period, lenders exploit an informational advantage with respect to their own customers. Those rents stimulate competition for customers in the first period. The informational advantage the current lender enjoys relative to its competitors determines interest rates, credit supply, and switching behavior. We evaluate the consequences of limiting the repricing of existing balances as implemented by recent legislation. Such restrictions increase deadweight losses and reduce ex ante consumer surplus. The model suggests novel approaches to identify empirically the effects of this law.

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Suting Hong & Robert M. Hunt & Konstantinos Serfes, Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Papers 18-23, 07 Nov 2018.
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Keywords: Financial contracts; Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act; holdup; risk-based pricing; credit supply
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.23
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