Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Liquidity Regulation and Financial Intermediaries
We document several effects of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) rule on dealers' financing and intermediation of securities. For identification, we exploit the fact that the US implementation is more stringent than that in foreign jurisdictions. In line with LCR incentives, US dealers reduce their reliance on repos as a way to finance inventories of high-quality assets and increase the maturity of lower-quality repos relative to foreign dealers; additionally, US dealers cut back on trades that downgrade their own collateral. Dealers are nevertheless still providing significant maturity transformation. We also show that significant de-risking occurs immediately after the 2007-09 crisis, before post-crisis regulations.
Cite this item
Marco Macchiavelli & Luke Pettit, Liquidity Regulation and Financial Intermediaries, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-084, 06 Dec 2018.
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
Keywords: Basel III ; Broker-dealers ; Liquidity coverage ratio ; Repurchase agreements
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2018-84
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