Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Speed Limit Policy and Liquidity Traps
The zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on interest rates makes speed limit policies (SLPs)---policies aimed at stabilizing the output growth---less effective. Away from the ZLB, the history dependence induced by a concern for output growth stabilization improves the inflation-output tradeoff for a discretionary central bank. However, in the aftermath of a deep recession with a binding ZLB, a central bank with an objective for output growth stabilization aims to engineer a more gradual increase in output than under the standard discretionary policy. The anticipation of a more restrained recovery exacerbates the declines in inflation and output when the lower bound is binding.
Cite this item
Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt & Paul Yoo, Speed Limit Policy and Liquidity Traps, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-050, 19 Jul 2018.
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Keywords: Liquidity traps ; Markov-perfect equilibrium ; Speed limit policy ; Zero lower bound
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2018-50
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